{"id":7122,"date":"2026-02-04T12:00:33","date_gmt":"2026-02-04T12:00:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/?p=7122"},"modified":"2026-03-20T10:12:10","modified_gmt":"2026-03-20T10:12:10","slug":"editorial","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/editorial\/","title":{"rendered":"The Editorial of February 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"
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By Jean-Rapha\u00ebl Peytregnet<\/p>\n

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The National Security Strategy (NSS)\u00a0published by the White House in\u00a0 November 2025 has had significant\u00a0 repercussions in the Asian region. This\u00a0 document comes in a context already marked\u00a0 by renewed Sino-American tensions, strategic\u00a0 realignments, and a reconfiguration of regional\u00a0 alliances. The NSS reviews the main\u00a0 developments observed in Asia: persistent and\u00a0 heightened tensions surrounding Taiwan,\u00a0 regional diplomatic dynamics, the growing role\u00a0 of allies, economic impacts, perceptions among\u00a0 Southeast Asian countries, and, finally, the\u00a0 adaptation of national strategies in an uncertain\u00a0 geopolitical environment.<\/p>\n

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Following a series of U.S. announcements\u2014 including significant arms sales to Taiwan\u00a0 (amounting to USD 11 billion, announced on\u00a0 December 18, 2025) and American and\u00a0 Japanese statements on the strategic\u00a0 importance of the Taiwan Strait\u2014China\u00a0 intensified its military exercises around the\u00a0 island for two consecutive days (December 29\u2013 30, 2025).<\/p>\n

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Maneuvers dubbed Justice Mission 2025\u00a0 (Zhengyi shiming-2025 yanxi) involved\u00a0 several dozen Chinese naval vessels and\u00a0 aircraft, including artillery strikes and\u00a0 missile launches in areas closer to Taiwan\u00a0 than ever before.<\/p>\n

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Regional media interpreted these maneuvers as\u00a0 implicit attempts to intimidate Taipei and, in\u00a0 particular, Japan, following statements by\u00a0 Japan\u2019s new Prime Minister in support of the\u00a0 island. In response to these exercises, several\u00a0countries publicly expressed their \u201cdeep\u00a0 concerns,\u201d judging China\u2019s actions to be\u00a0 provocative and potentially destabilizing for\u00a0 regional and global security (see the joint\u00a0 statement by G7 foreign ministers, including\u00a0 France). For its part, the U.S. administration\u00a0 reaffirmed the strategic importance of the Indo\u00a0Pacific and its interests in the region.<\/p>\n

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Taken together, these events have heightened\u00a0 the perceived risk of a military accident or a\u00a0 major crisis around Taiwan, which could\u00a0 escalate into a broader confrontation, even\u00a0 though leaders on all sides continue to seek to\u00a0 avoid open conflict.<\/p>\n

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In 2025, several important diplomatic initiatives\u00a0 were observed. In a context where some\u00a0 countries question U.S. commitment or fear a\u00a0 reversal in Washington\u2019s policy toward them,\u00a0 they have sought to establish alternative\u00a0 platforms for cooperation. Thus, a trilateral\u00a0 meeting between South Korea, China, and\u00a0 Japan was held for the first time after more than\u00a0 a year-long hiatus. These countries emphasized\u00a0 cooperation in areas such as health and civilian\u00a0 technologies, thereby illustrating a desire to\u00a0 revive regional dialogues independently of\u00a0 Washington.<\/p>\n

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Similarly, strong activity was observed around\u00a0 initiatives such as the Quad (Quadrilateral\u00a0 Security Dialogue bringing together the United\u00a0 States, Japan, India, and Australia), through\u00a0 which these countries seek to harmonize their\u00a0 security strategies without necessarily making\u00a0 their entire policy dependent solely on the U.S. NSS.<\/p>\n

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China, in its own official statements, has\u00a0 attempted to temper the escalation by calling\u00a0\u00a0for cooperation and mutual respect, while firmly\u00a0 defending its sovereignty and development\u00a0 interests. A spokesperson from the Chinese\u00a0 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Waijiaobu) notably\u00a0 explained that Beijing wished to work with the\u00a0 United States to promote a stable and\u00a0 sustainable relationship, while managing their\u00a0 differences constructively. Some Chinese\u00a0 analysts also view the NSS as a signal to engage\u00a0 in strategic dialogue with Washington.\u00a0 Nevertheless, Beijing still perceives the NSS as a\u00a0 containment strategy likely to increase tensions\u00a0 and regional instability.<\/p>\n

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Unlike Japan, China, and Taiwan, India did not\u00a0 officially react to the NSS. However, the\u00a0 American document assigns India a strategic\u00a0 role in the Indo-Pacific, positioning the\u00a0 subcontinent as a partner to contain China\u2019s\u00a0 growing influence in the region. New Delhi views\u00a0 this strategy as validation of its regional\u00a0 importance, while allowing it to maintain its\u00a0 policy of \u201cstrategic autonomy,\u201d which avoids full\u00a0 alignment with Washington.<\/p>\n

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The NSS indirectly encourages India to\u00a0 strengthen its military capabilities\u2014particularly\u00a0 naval, air, and cyber\u2014while modernizing its\u00a0 infrastructure to secure critical supply chains.\u00a0 On the economic front, the NSS offers New Delhi\u00a0 the opportunity to become an alternative hub to\u00a0 China-dependent supply chains, which should\u00a0 stimulate its industrial and technological\u00a0 development.<\/p>\n

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Japan\u2019s increase in its defense budget to 2\u00a0 percent of GDP, and Tokyo\u2019s growing awareness\u00a0 of its strategic role in the region\u2014particularly in a\u00a0 context of increasing rivalry with China\u2014are in\u00a0 line with the spirit of the NSS. Tokyo\u2019s stated\u00a0 objective is to reduce its dependence on U.S.\u00a0 protection while remaining a pillar of the\u00a0 regional security architecture. With the NSS,\u00a0 Tokyo receives confirmation of the strategic\u00a0 importance Washington assigns to it,\u00a0 particularly regarding the defense of Taiwan,\u00a0 which Japan considers vital to the stability of the\u00a0 archipelago.<\/p>\n

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The NSS also comes at a time when Washington\u00a0 is multiplying signals of support for Taipei,\u00a0 thereby prompting U.S. allies to clarify their own\u00a0 positions. This was the case on November 7,\u00a0 2025, when Japan\u2019s new Prime Minister stated\u00a0 before the Diet that an attack by China on\u00a0 Taiwan could constitute a \u201csituation threatening\u00a0 Japan\u2019s survival.\u201d Although the NSS does not go\u00a0 into detail regarding Japanese statements, its\u00a0 publication reinforces a strategic climate that\u00a0makes such positions more politically and\u00a0 militarily plausible.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

South Korea, for its part, is investing heavily\u00a0 in high-technology systems, particularly\u00a0 precision missiles, while Australia continues\u00a0 to expand its maritime and submarine\u00a0 capabilities. These developments reflect a\u00a0 significant strategic shift for states that\u00a0 previously relied heavily on the United\u00a0 States for their security.<\/p>\n

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Beyond national defense spending, concrete\u00a0 cooperation has also been strengthened. The\u00a0 Balikatan (\u201cshoulder to shoulder\u201d) 2025\u00a0 exercises between the Philippines and the\u00a0 United States were designed to be particularly\u00a0 intensive, including, for example, the integration\u00a0 of new coastal defense systems such as NMESIS\u00a0 (Naval\/Maritime Expeditionary Ship Interdiction\u00a0 System, a mobile anti-ship system). These\u00a0 exercises demonstrate a strengthening of\u00a0 military ties that, despite overall strategic\u00a0 uncertainty, continue to consolidate the U.S.\u00a0 regional presence, particularly in areas close to\u00a0 Taiwan and Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

U.S. policies linked to the NSS, particularly within\u00a0 the framework of an \u201cAmerica First\u201d agenda,\u00a0 have had direct economic repercussions in Asia.\u00a0 Sharp increases in U.S. tariffs have affected\u00a0 ASEAN countries\u2019 exports, leading to a downturn\u00a0 in regional markets while strengthening China\u2019s\u00a0 economic influence.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Studies show that Chinese companies are\u00a0 increasingly redirecting their exports toward\u00a0 Asian partners\u2014particularly Vietnam, Indonesia,\u00a0 and Singapore\u2014in order to circumvent U.S. trade\u00a0 sanctions, thereby highlighting a reorganization\u00a0 of global value chains and a strengthening of\u00a0 intra-Asian economic ties.<\/p>\n

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Media outlets and analysts in Southeast Asia\u00a0 have all noted that the NSS mentions the region\u00a0 very little, appearing only twice in the main text.\u00a0 This has led to the perception that Washington\u00a0 prioritizes other geographic areas, such as Latin\u00a0 America (the \u201cWestern Hemisphere\u201d), and that\u00a0 the U.S. capital uses ASEAN more as a\u00a0 bargaining chip in its rivalry with China than as\u00a0 an autonomous strategic partner. Such\u00a0 strategic dilemmas may arise and push the\u00a0 countries concerned to diversify their alliances.<\/p>\n

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In response, several Southeast Asian countries\u00a0 have sought to diversify their strategies by\u00a0 strengthening their own intra-regional\u00a0 cooperation mechanisms, increasing bilateral\u00a0 discussions with Beijing, Tokyo, and New Delhi,\u00a0 and maintaining high-level dialogues with\u00a0 Washington on specific issues such as maritime\u00a0 security, high technology, and supply chains.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

One of the most significant consequences of\u00a0 the NSS is the intensification of public and\u00a0 think-tank debates on security in Asia, the\u00a0 role of the United States, independent\u00a0 national strategies, and ways to ensure\u00a0 regional stability without exclusive\u00a0 dependence on Washington.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

These debates focus in particular on issues such\u00a0 as burden sharing, national sovereignty, the\u00a0 integration of advanced military technologies,\u00a0 and the management of Sino-American rivalry\u00a0 so as to minimize the risks of accidental\u00a0 escalation.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Since the publication of the NSS, Asia has\u00a0 witnessed a combination of strategic\u00a0 realignments, heightened tensions, and efforts\u00a0 toward regional autonomy.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The Taiwan issue remains a focal point of\u00a0 tensions, with more visible Chinese military\u00a0 exercises prompting political reactions from U.S.\u00a0 allies. Traditional U.S. allies (Japan, South Korea,\u00a0 the Philippines, Thailand, as well as Taiwan) are\u00a0 strengthening their military capabilities or\u00a0 reaffirming their commitments to Washington,\u00a0 sometimes at the cost of intense domestic\u00a0 debates. The NSS acts as a clear signal that Asia\u00a0 must be more proactive and less dependent on\u00a0 the United States for its security. In Southeast\u00a0 Asia, countries are seeking to maintain a\u00a0 balance among the major powers while\u00a0 reassessing their economic and strategic\u00a0 priorities.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The United States emphasizes the role of the\u00a0 Indo-Pacific in its overall strategy, which ensures\u00a0 a certain level of deterrence against China and\u00a0 North Korea. Finally, the region is marked by a\u00a0 deep strategic debate on how to manage\u00a0 uncertainty surrounding U.S. commitment and\u00a0 the rise of China as a global power.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

These trends show that, although the NSS may\u00a0 be perceived as a U.S. policy document\u00a0 centered on American interests\u2014signaling an\u00a0 implicit revival of the Monroe Doctrine, whereby\u00a0 Washington places territorial security and\u00a0 domestic economic resilience at the core of its\u00a0 doctrine\u2014its effects in Asia are concrete,\u00a0 complex, and multidimensional.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

*****<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

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A career diplomat who studied Chinese studies in France and then worked in development aid as an international\u00a0 expert for UNESCO in Laos (1988-1991), Jean-Rapha\u00ebl PEYTREGNET has held positions including Consul General of\u00a0 France in Guangzhou (2007-2011) and Beijing (2015-2018), as well as in Mumbai\/Bombay from 2011 to 2015. He was\u00a0 responsible for Asia at the Center for Analysis, Forecasting, and Strategy (CAPS) attached to the office of the\u00a0 Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs (2018-2021) and finally Special Advisor to the Director for Asia-Oceania\u00a0 (2021-2023).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Jean-Rapha\u00ebl Peytregnet   The National Security Strategy (NSS)\u00a0published by the White House in\u00a0 November 2025 has had significant\u00a0 repercussions in the Asian region. This\u00a0 document comes in a context already marked\u00a0 by renewed Sino-American tensions, strategic\u00a0 realignments, and a reconfiguration of regional\u00a0 alliances. The NSS reviews the main\u00a0 developments […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":6908,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"episode_type":"","audio_file":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"","date_recorded":"","explicit":"","block":"","filesize_raw":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[118],"tags":[],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7122"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7122"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7122\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7138,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7122\/revisions\/7138"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6908"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7122"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7122"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7122"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}