{"id":7160,"date":"2026-03-04T12:00:09","date_gmt":"2026-03-04T12:00:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/?p=7160"},"modified":"2026-03-20T10:17:36","modified_gmt":"2026-03-20T10:17:36","slug":"editorial-of-march-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/editorial-of-march-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"The editorial of March 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"
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By Jean-Rapha\u00ebl Peytregnent<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

We no longer defend sovereignty today:\u00a0we use it. It is no longer a universal\u00a0 principle [1], still less a bulwark against\u00a0 war or arbitrariness [2]. It has become a\u00a0 rhetorical weapon, a means for major powers to\u00a0 justify what they condemn in others. And Asia,\u00a0 far from being a mere bystander, stands at the\u00a0 heart of this brutal reconfiguration of the\u00a0 international order.<\/p>\n

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 <\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Russia\u2019s aggression against Ukraine has\u00a0 dispelled any ambiguity.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

A state can invade another sovereign state,\u00a0 annex territory, bombard cities and civilian\u00a0 populations, without the international\u00a0 system proving capable of preventing it.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Condemnations may rain down and sanctions\u00a0 accumulate, yet the violated border remains so.\u00a0 This precedent carries profound significance for\u00a0 Asia. It demonstrates that sovereignty is\u00a0 protected neither by international law nor by the\u00a0 principles that underpin it, but by the balance of\u00a0 power. China, moreover, has not been mistaken\u00a0 in reading this reality. Beijing has never\u00a0 genuinely defended Ukrainian sovereignty [3].<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The Chinese capital did not formally condemn\u00a0 the invasion, nor did it speak of aggression,\u00a0 contenting itself with echoing the Russian\u00a0 narrative.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

This caution is not neutrality but cold calculation: a\u00a0 determination not to weaken a strategic partner\u00a0 while observing the reactions of a common\u00a0 adversary\u2014the United States. The lesson is simple:\u00a0 it is not the violation of sovereignty that poses a\u00a0 problem, but who commits it.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Accordingly, China\u2019s call for \u201cunification\u201d (tongyi)\u00a0 with Taiwan cannot be understood in isolation. It\u00a0 forms part of a broader vision in which\u00a0 sovereignty becomes the right of powerful\u00a0 states to impose their reading of history. Taiwan\u00a0 is not perceived as a political entity, but as a\u00a0 territory to be reclaimed\u2014less out of nationalist\u00a0 sentiment than for strategic reasons. Taiwan\u2019s\u00a0 democracy, the will of its population, and its de\u00a0 facto independence are relegated to secondary\u00a0 considerations in the face of imperatives of\u00a0 power [4].<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Yet reducing the question of sovereignty in Asia\u00a0 to Taiwan would be a mistake. The Asian\u00a0 continent is a veritable minefield of sovereignty\u00a0 disputes. In the South China Sea (the \u201cnine-dash\u00a0 line\u201d) and the East China Sea (the Senkaku\/Diaoyutai Islands), several states see their\u00a0 Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) challenged by\u00a0 a power that transforms reclaimed reefs into\u00a0 military bases.<\/p>\n

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In the Himalayan region, India and China confront\u00a0 one another through armed demonstrations. The\u00a0 same holds true between Thailand and\u00a0 Cambodia. On the Korean peninsula, two states\u00a0 continue to claim exclusive legitimacy over a\u00a0 single nation. In Kashmir, sovereignty has been a\u00a0 bloody fault line between India and Pakistan for\u00a0 nearly eighty years.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In this context, Western discourse on the defense\u00a0 of sovereignty also appears weakened. The\u00a0 abduction of Venezuelan President Nicol\u00e1s\u00a0 Maduro by the United States produced a\u00a0 devastating effect. Whatever judgment one may\u00a0 pass on the Venezuelan regime, the removal of a\u00a0 head of state\u2014however illegitimate\u2014from his\u00a0 territory by a foreign power constitutes a major\u00a0 breach of international norms [5]. For Asian\u00a0states, the message is unequivocal: sovereignty\u00a0 is respected only so long as it does not obstruct.<\/p>\n

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Donald Trump\u2019s remarks about acquiring\u00a0 Greenland, under the guise of strategic security\u00a0 [6], completed this shift. Behind the provocation\u00a0 lies a blunt logic: territories are no longer\u00a0 inhabited political spaces but geostrategic\u00a0 pawns. This vision finds a troubling echo in Asia,\u00a0 where certain states fear that their sovereignty\u00a0 might one day be deemed negotiable,\u00a0 purchasable, or circumventable. Faced with this\u00a0 accumulation of precedents, Asia can draw only\u00a0 a bitter conclusion: sovereignty is not a right but\u00a0 a privilege reserved for those able to defend it\u00a0 militarily, economically, or diplomatically. Others\u00a0 must adapt, align, or remain silent.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The danger is immense. A world in which\u00a0 sovereignty becomes relative is one in which\u00a0 force replaces law, history is rewritten by the\u00a0 victors, and grey zones multiply until they\u00a0 explode.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Asia\u2014with its colonial legacies, disputed\u00a0 borders, and rival powers\u2014is undoubtedly\u00a0 the region with the most to lose in such a\u00a0 drift.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

By invoking sovereignty when it suits them and\u00a0 ignoring it when it constrains them, the great\u00a0 powers undermine the only principle capable of\u00a0 limiting their own violence. And when no one\u00a0 believes in sovereignty any longer, only one rule\u00a0 remains: that of the strongest.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Three trajectories now emerge for Asia.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The first is that of generalized armed deterrence.\u00a0 In the face of the weakening of law, states\u2014such\u00a0 as China, Japan, or India\u2014are strengthening\u00a0 their military capabilities, multiplying\u00a0 partnerships and alliances, accepting the\u00a0 premise that only force guarantees sovereignty.\u00a0 This logic heightens the risks of escalation,\u00a0 notably around Taiwan, in the South and East\u00a0 China Seas, along the Sino-Indian and Indo\u00a0Pakistani borders, and on the Korean peninsula.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The second trajectory is that of fragmented\u00a0 sovereignty, in which certain states retain formal\u00a0 autonomy but endure growing strategic,\u00a0 economic, or technological dependence. In this\u00a0 scenario, sovereignty persists juridically but\u00a0 dissolves within asymmetric interdependence\u00a0 and pressures exerted by major powers. This is\u00a0 the case, in particular, for most of the former\u00a0 tributary states of China in Southeast Asia. Yet\u00a0they continue to rely on the American umbrella\u00a0 for protection.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The third path\u2014more fragile yet more ambitious \u2014would entail a collective reaffirmation of\u00a0 international law by Asian states themselves.\u00a0 This would require breaking with tacit\u00a0 acceptance of faits accomplis, strengthening\u00a0 regional dispute-settlement mechanisms\u00a0 (ASEAN [7], ARF [8], SAARC [9], SCO [10], RCEP [11],\u00a0 CPTPP [12]), and restoring binding force to the\u00a0 principles of the United Nations Charter. Nothing\u00a0 today suggests that this course will prevail.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Asia thus stands at a pivotal moment. If\u00a0 sovereignty continues to be treated as a\u00a0 strategic adjustment variable, the continent\u00a0 could become the epicenter of the major crises\u00a0 of the twenty-first century. If, on the contrary,\u00a0 Asia succeeds in reasserting the primacy of law\u00a0 over force, it could play a decisive role in\u00a0 refounding an international order now\u00a0 profoundly weakened.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[1] Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter: \u201cThe\u00a0 Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign\u00a0 equality of all its Members.\u201d<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[2] Ibid., Article 2(4): \u201cAll Members shall refrain in their\u00a0 international relations from the threat or use of force against\u00a0 the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,\u00a0 or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the\u00a0 United Nations.\u201d<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[3]\u00a0https:\/\/lerubicon.org\/la-chine-lukraine-et-les dilemmes-dune-definition-de-la-souverainete\/<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[4] In contravention of Article 1(2) of the Charter, which\u00a0 defines the purposes of the United Nations as including: \u201cto\u00a0 develop friendly relations among nations based on respect\u00a0 for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of\u00a0 peoples.\u201d<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[5] Article 2(7) of the Charter: \u201cNothing contained in the\u00a0 present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to\u00a0 intervene in matters which are essentially within the\u00a0 domestic jurisdiction of any state\u2026\u201d<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[6] In 2018, China declared itself a \u201cnear-Arctic state\u201d with\u00a0 the aim of increasing its influence in the region. Beijing also\u00a0 announced its intention to build a \u201cPolar Silk Road\u201d as part of\u00a0 its global Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), through which it has\u00a0 developed economic ties with numerous countries,\u00a0 including in Latin America.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[7] Association of Southeast Asian Nations, now comprising\u00a0 the eleven member states of Southeast Asia (including\u00a0 Timor-Leste), which constitute the regional core of the area\u00a0 (principle of centrality), connecting economic, security, and\u00a0 diplomatic frameworks without taking sides or forming\u00a0 military blocs. The other frameworks listed below revolve\u00a0 around or interact with it.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[8] ASEAN Regional Forum, a military and strategic dialogue\u00a0 forum in the Asia-Pacific bringing together twenty-seven\u00a0 members, including the United States, China, Russia, Japan,\u00a0 South Korea, India, Australia, and the European Union.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[9] South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, a\u00a0 primarily economic South Asian regional organization\u00a0 comprising eight states: Afghanistan (membership de facto\u00a0 suspended), Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal,\u00a0 Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[10] Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, founded in 2001 at\u00a0 the initiative of China and Russia, comprising nine members\u00a0 (including India, Pakistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,\u00a0 Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), initially focused on border\u00a0 security in Central Asia.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[11] Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, bringing\u00a0 together the eleven ASEAN countries plus China, Japan,\u00a0 South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, covering\u00a0 approximately 30% of global GDP and constituting the\u00a0 largest free-trade agreement in the world.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[12] Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans Pacific Partnership, which replaced the Trans-Pacific\u00a0 Partnership (TPP) in 2018 after the withdrawal of the United\u00a0 States, comprising twelve member countries, including\u00a0 Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam,\u00a0 Malaysia, and Brunei in Asia-Pacific; Canada, Mexico, Chile,\u00a0 and Peru in the Americas; and the United Kingdom in Europe.\u00a0 The CPTPP aims to set the rules of future trade and to limit\u00a0 China\u2019s normative influence.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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 <\/p>\n

*****<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

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A career diplomat who studied Chinese studies in France and then worked in development aid as an international\u00a0 expert for UNESCO in Laos (1988-1991), Jean-Rapha\u00ebl PEYTREGNET has held positions including Consul General of\u00a0 France in Guangzhou (2007-2011) and Beijing (2015-2018), as well as in Mumbai\/Bombay from 2011 to 2015. He was\u00a0 responsible for Asia at the Center for Analysis, Forecasting, and Strategy (CAPS) attached to the office of the\u00a0 Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs (2018-2021) and finally Special Advisor to the Director for Asia-Oceania\u00a0 (2021-2023).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Jean-Rapha\u00ebl Peytregnent   We no longer defend sovereignty today:\u00a0we use it. It is no longer a universal\u00a0 principle [1], still less a bulwark against\u00a0 war or arbitrariness [2]. It has become a\u00a0 rhetorical weapon, a means for major powers to\u00a0 justify what they condemn in others. And Asia,\u00a0 far […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":6947,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"episode_type":"","audio_file":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"","date_recorded":"","explicit":"","block":"","filesize_raw":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[118],"tags":[],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7160"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7160"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7160\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7165,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7160\/revisions\/7165"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6947"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7160"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7160"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7160"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}