{"id":7166,"date":"2026-03-04T13:00:43","date_gmt":"2026-03-04T13:00:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/?p=7166"},"modified":"2026-03-25T14:10:17","modified_gmt":"2026-03-25T14:10:17","slug":"asia-and-the-nuclear-age-what-future","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/asia-and-the-nuclear-age-what-future\/","title":{"rendered":"Asia and the nuclear age: what future?"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

By Emmanuel V\u00e9ron<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Jean-Rapha\u00ebl Peytregnet: Eighty years after the\u00a0 United States dropped atomic bombs on\u00a0 Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we are witnessing a\u00a0 resurgence of crises pitting\u2014or risking pitting\u2014\u00a0<\/b>nuclear powers against one another (Russia vs. the\u00a0 United States, India vs. Pakistan, China vs. the\u00a0 United States\/Taiwan, North Korea vs. the United\u00a0 States\/South Korea\/Japan, etc.). In Asia in\u00a0 particular, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear\u00a0 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and, by\u00a0 2017, had developed the capability to strike U.S.\u00a0 territory with an intercontinental ballistic missile\u00a0 (ICBM). Beyond this example, how do you assess\u00a0 the most recent developments in nuclear\u00a0 proliferation in Asia?\u00a0\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Emmanuel V\u00e9ron:\u00a0<\/b>Asia stands as a singular case,\u00a0 on the one hand, as you recall, because of the\u00a0 use of the atomic weapon\u2014the two bombs\u00a0 dropped by the United States in August 1945 on\u00a0 the cities of Hiroshima and then Nagasaki\u2014and\u00a0 on the other hand, today, because of the strong\u00a0 concentration of strategic stakes and\u00a0 international competition, in which the rise of\u00a0 conventional arsenals and nuclear weapons\u00a0 embodies the military-strategic pillars.\u00a0 Historically, the vast Asia-Pacific region has\u00a0 been the site of a series of American, British, and\u00a0 French tests, notably in the South Pacific. The fastest and most significant proliferation is\u00a0 indeed taking place in Asia.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Nuclear proliferation in Asia is an\u00a0 expanding reality. The era of disarmament\u00a0 is over.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

First, China is doubling its arsenal, moving from\u00a0 600 warheads in 2025 toward a horizon of 1,000\u00a0 warheads in 2030, followed by North Korea, India\u00a0 and Pakistan, which are also increasing their\u00a0 stockpiles. In addition to this vertical proliferation\u00a0 (the increase of arsenals of nuclear-armed\u00a0 states), weapons modernization is also\u00a0 underway throughout nuclear Asia.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Finally, horizontal proliferation\u2014that is, the\u00a0 accession of a new state to military nuclear\u00a0 capability, either through its own means or\u00a0 through the acquisition of means, techniques\u00a0 and materials from a nuclear-armed state\u2014is a\u00a0 recurring strategic issue in Asia, particularly in\u00a0 response to the vertical proliferation of China\u00a0 and North Korea.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

For more than a decade, the expansion of\u00a0 arsenals has led analysts to examine\u00a0 deterrence through the prism of a \u201cnew nuclear age\u201d or \u201cthird nuclear age.\u201d The third nuclear\u00a0 age was characterized by Th\u00e9r\u00e8se Delpech\u00a0 (1948\u20132012) as an era of \u201cstrategic piracy,\u201d\u00a0 marked by the entry into the strategic\u00a0 landscape of new nuclear-armed states, the\u00a0 erosion of non-proliferation and arms-control\u00a0 agreements, and the development of \u201cnon nuclear strategic weapons.\u201d<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

These dynamics, centered on regional\u00a0 tensions such as in South Asia (India\u2013 Pakistan) and East Asia (China\u2013North\u00a0 Korea), stimulate modernization and a\u00a0 regional arms race, with risks of escalation\u00a0 and a challenge to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The significant expansion of China\u2019s arsenal,\u00a0 reinforcing its position as a major nuclear power,\u00a0 is leading to a recomposition of regional\u00a0 defense policies (Japan, South Korea and India)\u00a0 and a repositioning of the United States. North\u00a0 Korea\u2019s trajectory (with an estimated arsenal of\u00a0 around 50 warheads), despite international\u00a0 sanctions, points to a continuation of the\u00a0 development of its ballistic and nuclear\u00a0 capabilities, against the backdrop of the\u00a0 Chinese and Russian equation, including\u00a0 Pakistani links from the outset of its program.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Finally, India and Pakistan are engaged in a\u00a0 historical and doctrinal rivalry, with Islamabad\u00a0 seeking tactical deterrence vis-\u00e0-vis New Delhi,\u00a0 which, for its part, focuses more on political\u00a0 deterrence. According to SIPRI (Stockholm\u00a0 International Peace Research Institute), there is\u00a0 near parity in warhead numbers: 172 for India\u00a0 and 170 for Pakistan. Neither country is a\u00a0 signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation\u00a0 of Nuclear Weapons.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Chinese proliferation and the Indo Pakistani strategic rivalry, today and\u00a0 tomorrow, feed into one another.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Nuclear tensions in Asia (but also in the Middle\u00a0 East, with Israel, as well as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and\u00a0 even Turkey) are increasing, with dynamics\u00a0 specific to each theater. We are indeed dealing\u00a0 with a nuclear multipolarity that is more\u00a0 unstable and more complex than deterrence\/\u00a0proliferation during the Cold War and the\u00a0 balance between the two blocs. Finally, it should\u00a0 be recalled that the interest in civilian nuclear\u00a0 energy among certain states in Asia (Southeast Asia) sometimes raises questions about the\u00a0 boundary between civilian energy and potential\u00a0 military programs, through the diversion of uses\u00a0 and nuclear engineering. The difference\u00a0 essentially lies in the level of uranium-235\u00a0 enrichment. A civilian facility can produce and\u00a0 be transformed into a military installation (cf.\u00a0 the Iranian program).<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The NPT commits the 190 countries (out of 193)\u00a0 that are parties to it not to transfer nuclear\u00a0 weapons to any country. Can it still be considered\u00a0 an effective instrument to combat nuclear\u00a0 proliferation when it failed to prevent India and\u00a0 Pakistan\u2014who have still not joined it to this day\u2014 from acquiring nuclear weapons in the 1990s?\u00a0 According to the Pentagon and the Stockholm\u00a0 International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),\u00a0 China continues to develop its nuclear capabilities\u00a0 and could have around 1,500 warheads by 2035\u00a0 (approximately one third of the Russian arsenal),\u00a0 compared to 500 in January 2024. The same applies\u00a0 to India and Pakistan, which also appear to be\u00a0 strengthening their nuclear arsenals with new\u00a0 delivery systems under development, according to\u00a0 a study conducted by the Nuclear Information\u00a0 Project of the Federation of American Scientists.\u00a0\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The NPT is the most widely supported arms control agreement. To date, four states have not\u00a0 signed the NPT: India, South Sudan, Israel and\u00a0 Pakistan. It should also be noted that North\u00a0 Korea announced its intention to withdraw from\u00a0 the NPT. The NPT was concluded in 1968 and\u00a0 experienced a revival after 1991.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

There is also the CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty) (1996), which aims to ban all\u00a0 tests, and the TPNW (Treaty on the Prohibition of\u00a0 Nuclear Weapons) (2021), which prohibits\u00a0 possession and use, but is not yet in force due to\u00a0 a lack of ratifications.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The NPT is not entirely obsolete. For example, U.S.\u00a0 nuclear weapons reportedly located on\u00a0 German, Italian, Turkish, Dutch and Belgian\u00a0 territory (so-called DCA nations for Dual\u00a0Capable Aircraft \u2013 gravity bombs) remain\u00a0 under permanent U.S. control in accordance\u00a0 with the NPT.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

However, the deep international divergences\u00a0 and ruptures, notably within the UN Security\u00a0 Council, that is to say, the cohesion and\u00a0 authority of the \u201cnuclear directorate\u201d to produce\u00a0 norms of conduct and ensure compliance with\u00a0 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear\u00a0 Weapons (NPT), are compromised. The\u00a0 dismantling or denunciation of the principal\u00a0 nuclear disarmament treaties is significant and\u00a0 illustrates the international grammar of the past\u00a0 one to two decades, whereas the NPT was reputed to be the cornerstone of global nuclear\u00a0 security.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

China\u2019s growing geopolitical weight over\u00a0 the past two decades, its sustained and\u00a0 continuous \u201carsenalization\u201d (conventional\u00a0 and nuclear), are contributing to a\u00a0 recomposition of international balances, of\u00a0 a grammar dating back to the Cold War\u00a0 and, as mentioned above, to the \u201cnew\u00a0 nuclear age,\u201d seeking, in the long term, a\u00a0 form of parity with U.S. forces, if one adds\u00a0 Russian, and even North Korean and\/or\u00a0 Pakistani arsenals.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

American sources, notably from the Department\u00a0 of War (formerly the Department of Defense,\u00a0 before Trump II), recall a horizon of 1,500\u00a0 warheads by 2035.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The modernization of China\u2019s nuclear arsenal\u00a0 has both accelerated and expanded in recent\u00a0 years. Over the past five years, China has\u00a0 significantly strengthened its nuclear\u00a0 modernization program by deploying more\u00a0 types and a greater number of nuclear\u00a0 weapons than ever before.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

China has continued to develop its three new\u00a0 silo fields (Yumen in Gansu province, Hami in\u00a0 Xinjiang province, Yulin near Ordos) for its solid fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), to\u00a0 expand construction of new silos for its liquid fuel DF-5 ICBMs, to develop new variants of\u00a0 ICBMs and advanced strategic delivery systems,\u00a0 and has likely produced surplus warheads for\u00a0 potential use on these systems once deployed.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

China has also expanded its arsenal of DF-26\u00a0 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which\u00a0 appear to have completely replaced the\u00a0 medium-range DF-21 in its nuclear role. At sea,\u00a0 China has modernized its Type 094 ballistic\u00a0 missile submarines with the longer-range JL-3\u00a0 ballistic missile. In addition, China has recently\u00a0 reassigned an operational nuclear mission to its\u00a0 bombers and is developing an air-launched\u00a0 ballistic missile that could have nuclear\u00a0 capabilities.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Overall, China\u2019s nuclear expansion is one of the\u00a0 largest and fastest among the nine nuclear armed states. The Bulletin of the Atomic\u00a0 Scientists estimates that China has built up a\u00a0 stockpile of approximately 600 nuclear warheads intended to be delivered by land based ballistic missiles, sea-based ballistic\u00a0 missiles, and bombers.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Thus, the entire triad is being modernized. The\u00a0 military parade of 3 September 2025 in Beijing\u00a0 showcased the extent of a large part of its\u00a0 modernizations and weapons. The Pentagon\u00a0 indicated in 2024 that China\u2019s nuclear stockpile\u00a0 had \u201cexceeded 600 operational warheads by\u00a0 mid-2024\u201d (U.S. Department of Defense, 2024).<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

However, Chinese warheads are not\u00a0 \u201coperational\u201d in the same way as U.S. and\u00a0 Russian nuclear warheads deployed on missiles\u00a0 and at bomber bases; the vast majority of\u00a0 Chinese warheads are reportedly stored\u00a0 separately from their launchers.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

India continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal,\u00a0 with at least four new weapon systems and\u00a0 several new launch platforms under\u00a0 development to complement or replace existing\u00a0 aircraft, land-based systems, and sea-based\u00a0 systems capable of carrying nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Several of these systems are nearing\u00a0 completion and are expected to be deployed\u00a0 soon. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists\u00a0 estimates that India may have produced\u00a0 enough weapons-grade plutonium for 130 to 210\u00a0 nuclear warheads, but has probably produced\u00a0 only around 172, although the country\u2019s warhead\u00a0 stockpile is likely to grow.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

India continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal\u00a0 and to operationalize its nascent triad. The\u00a0 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimates that\u00a0 India currently operates eight different systems\u00a0 capable of delivering nuclear weapons: two\u00a0 aircraft, five land-based ballistic missiles, and\u00a0 one sea-based ballistic missile.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

At least five other systems are under\u00a0 development, most of which are expected to be\u00a0 completed shortly and deployed with the armed\u00a0 forces. Pakistan is pursuing the gradual\u00a0 modernization of its nuclear arsenal, with\u00a0 improved and new delivery systems, and a\u00a0 rapidly expanding fissile material production\u00a0 industry. Analysis of commercial satellite imagery\u00a0 of construction at Pakistani army garrisons and\u00a0 air bases reveals what appear to be newer\u00a0 launchers and facilities, potentially linked to\u00a0 Pakistan\u2019s nuclear forces, although official\u00a0 information on Pakistani nuclear units remains\u00a0 scarce. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists\u00a0 estimates that Pakistan possesses a stockpile of\u00a0 approximately 170 nuclear warheads.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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This estimate carries a margin of uncertainty\u00a0 given the opaque nature of proliferation in this\u00a0 strategic environment. With several new delivery\u00a0 systems under development, four plutonium\u00a0 production reactors, and an expanding uranium\u00a0 enrichment infrastructure, Pakistan\u2019s weapons\u00a0 stockpile could further increase in the coming\u00a0 years. The scale of this increase will depend on\u00a0 several factors, notably the number of nuclear\u00a0 launchers Pakistan plans to deploy, the\u00a0 evolution of its nuclear strategy, and the growth\u00a0 of India\u2019s nuclear arsenal.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

North Korea has made considerable\u00a0 advances over the past two decades in\u00a0 developing its nuclear arsenal as political\u00a0 leverage against the United States.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Since 2006, it has conducted six nuclear tests,\u00a0 updated its nuclear doctrine to emphasize the\u00a0 irreversible role of nuclear weapons for its\u00a0 national security, and continued deploying\u00a0 various new missiles tested in flight from new\u00a0 launch platforms. It is widely accepted that\u00a0 North Korea possesses operational nuclear\u00a0 warheads for its short- and medium-range\u00a0 missiles, and possibly for its longer-range\u00a0 missiles, although this latter capability has not\u00a0 yet been publicly demonstrated.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,\u00a0 uncertainty remains regarding the deployed\u00a0 North Korean missiles equipped with an\u00a0 operational nuclear capability. However, it is\u00a0 acknowledged that the regime intends to equip\u00a0 itself with an operational nuclear arsenal\u00a0 capable of threatening targets in East Asia, the\u00a0 United States, and Europe.<\/p>\n

In 2021, Kim Jong-un announced several key\u00a0 strategic objectives for North Korea\u2019s nuclear\u00a0 weapons program: 1) the production of very\u00a0 large nuclear warheads; 2) the production of\u00a0 smaller and lighter nuclear weapons for tactical\u00a0 use; 3) the improvement of precision strike and\u00a0 range capabilities; 4) the introduction of\u00a0 hypersonic glide warheads; 5) the development\u00a0 of solid-fuel intercontinental, submarine\u00a0launched, and land-based ballistic rockets; and\u00a0 6) the introduction of a nuclear-powered\u00a0 submarine and a submarine-launched\u00a0 strategic nuclear weapon.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Despite these clarifications, the real and precise\u00a0 assessment of the regime\u2019s advances and\u00a0 capabilities remains unclear. The intensification\u00a0 of relations between Russia and North Korea\u00a0 (with Beijing in the background) in the context of the war in Ukraine could contribute to an\u00a0 upgrading of North Korea\u2019s ballistic and nuclear\u00a0 program.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Can it be said that Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine\u2014a\u00a0 country that had definitively relinquished the\u00a0 nuclear weapons stationed on its territory in 1996\u2014 has in its own way contributed to the acceleration\u00a0 of nuclear proliferation worldwide? Or at least to\u00a0 the consideration that only nuclear weapons\u00a0 provide a sufficiently deterrent means to avoid\u00a0 aggression by a third country? Moreover, we have\u00a0 seen that in exchange for Pyongyang\u2019s military\u00a0 support in this conflict with Ukraine, Moscow\u00a0 ended its, admittedly limited, cooperation with the\u00a0 United States aimed at curbing North Korean\u00a0 ambitions, even going so far as to use its veto at\u00a0 the United Nations Security Council to block UN\u00a0 monitoring of the implementation of sanctions\u00a0 imposed by the international community against\u00a0 North Korea in relation to the development of its\u00a0 military nuclear program. What can be concluded\u00a0 from this?\u00a0\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

One of the characteristics of the \u201cthird nuclear\u00a0 age\u201d is unconstrained competition. In a recent\u00a0 article, Louis Gautier [1] recalled: \u201cThe third\u00a0 nuclear age is indeed characterized by the\u00a0 resumption of a frenzied arms race, strategic\u00a0 competition between blocs of powers, and a\u00a0 relaxation of the disciplines of prudence that\u00a0 had until then been deeply internalized by\u00a0 nuclear states\u2026<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In the third nuclear age, there are no longer any\u00a0 leaders, nor any directorate.\u201d This new race and\u00a0 competition corresponds to a generalized\u00a0 disinhibition and to nuclear blackmail or\u00a0 intimidation. Finally, with regard to the war in\u00a0 Ukraine, nuclear blackmail is combined with a\u00a0 form of theater sanctuarization, an \u201caggressive\u00a0 sanctuarization\u201d in which the weapon is used for\u00a0 purposes of conquest and coercion.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

This could constitute a precedent, notably in the\u00a0 strategic framework of Taiwan. In light of Sino Russian cooperation, exchanges, and feedback\u00a0 on the war in Ukraine, Beijing could draw\u00a0 inspiration from Russia in this logic of\u00a0 \u201caggressive sanctuarization.\u201d<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Thus, with regard to nuclear Asia and the\u00a0 strategic relations between China, Russia, and\u00a0 North Korea, it is not only a question of the\u00a0 quantitative and qualitative rise in weapons, but\u00a0 also of increased, multidirectional pressure from\u00a0 \u201caggressive\u201d deterrence across several\u00a0 simultaneous theaters.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Among the United States\u2019 allies threatened by a\u00a0 regional conflict are, in Asia in particular, Japan,\u00a0 Taiwan and South Korea. The latter, like others in\u00a0\u00a0<\/b>Europe, may have been led to question the\u00a0 credibility of the American \u201cnuclear umbrella\u201d\u00a0 following certain impromptu statements by\u00a0 President Trump. If one or more of these countries,\u00a0 particularly in East Asia, were to decide\u2014as some\u00a0 of their leaders have already contemplated\u2014to\u00a0 build their own nuclear weapons in order to guard\u00a0 against any external threat, could this, in your\u00a0 view, create a domino effect in the region and\u00a0 consequently sound the death knell of the nuclear\u00a0 non-proliferation regime?\u00a0\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In July 2024, the United States and South Korea adopted a joint directive aimed at\u00a0strengthening their cooperation on nuclear\u00a0 deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Emerging\u00a0 from the work of the Nuclear Consultative Group\u00a0 established in 2023, this directive notably seeks\u00a0 to better integrate South Korean conventional\u00a0 forces into potential U.S. nuclear operations.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

It forms part of a series of U.S. reassurance\u00a0 measures, such as the symbolic port call of a\u00a0 U.S. nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine\u00a0 (USS Kentucky \u2013 SSBN 737) in Busan in 2023. This\u00a0 constitutes a form of strategic signaling. A\u00a0 comparable dynamic exists with Japan, albeit\u00a0 more discreetly, with the aim of consolidating\u00a0 U.S. extended deterrence in the face of growing\u00a0 threats from China and North Korea, in a context\u00a0 of increasing doubts regarding the credibility of\u00a0 that deterrence.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Since the early 2010s, the debate on U.S.\u00a0 extended deterrence in Northeast Asia has\u00a0 intensified, in the wake of the \u201cpivot to Asia\u201d\u00a0 launched by the Obama administration and\u00a0 subsequently the Indo-Pacific strategy. This\u00a0 strategic reorientation aimed to respond to the\u00a0 growing threats posed by North Korea and\u00a0 China to U.S. allies, particularly Japan and South\u00a0 Korea.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The acceleration of North Korea\u2019s ballistic\u00a0 and nuclear programs, as well as the\u00a0 modernization of Chinese forces, has\u00a0 reinforced the perception of a more\u00a0 unstable security environment. The\u00a0 military trajectory of China and North\u00a0 Korea is shaping the defense tools of both\u00a0 South Korea and Japan.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In response to these developments, Washington\u00a0 has deepened its mechanisms for consultation\u00a0 and coordination with its allies. In South Korea,\u00a0 frameworks such as the Tailored Deterrence\u00a0 Strategy (TDS) have been developed and\u00a0\u00a0revised in order to adapt deterrence to North\u00a0 Korean threats. In Japan, the Extended\u00a0 Deterrence Dialogue has become one of the\u00a0 most sophisticated instruments of bilateral\u00a0 cooperation in the field of deterrence.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

However, despite this institutional strengthening,\u00a0 the credibility of U.S. guarantees remains\u00a0 contested. In both South Korea and Japan,\u00a0 debates are emerging over the reliability of the\u00a0 American commitment, fueling calls for the\u00a0 reintroduction of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons\u00a0 or even for the acquisition of national nuclear\u00a0 capabilities, particularly in South Korea.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

These trends reveal a persistent fragility in\u00a0 extended deterrence, aggravated by the\u00a0 perception that the United States might seek to\u00a0 avoid nuclear escalation by constraining its\u00a0 allies during major crises.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

A parallel is drawn with the adaptation of NATO\u00a0 deterrence in Europe, initiated in 2010 and\u00a0 accelerated after 2014. In both regions, the need\u00a0 for greater burden-sharing and increased\u00a0 investment by allies is now acknowledged,\u00a0 although national capabilities and political will\u00a0 vary.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Finally, reflection on extended deterrence in\u00a0 Northeast Asia has been shaped by European\u00a0 conflicts, notably the war in Ukraine. A growing\u00a0 consensus underscores the interdependence of\u00a0 the European and Asian theaters, even if\u00a0 perceptions of threat diverge. The main risk\u00a0 identified is not so much a breakdown of the\u00a0 nuclear balance as nuclear escalation resulting\u00a0 from conventional conflicts, which has become\u00a0 a central factor of strategic instability in both\u00a0 regions.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

While historically strongly committed to non proliferation, Japan and South Korea are now at\u00a0 the center of major reflection on horizontal\u00a0 proliferation. Our era is clearly marked by a\u00a0 recomposition of the global nuclear order. In the\u00a0 same article, Louis Gautier recalled: \u201cJapan,\u00a0 which refused to sign the TPNW (Treaty on the\u00a0 Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons) \u2018so as not to\u00a0 insult the future,\u2019 is striving at all costs to\u00a0 revitalize the American nuclear guarantee. But\u00a0 its efforts are marked by considerable\u00a0 nervousness. The same is true of the less\u00a0 controlled calls by certain South Korean leaders\u00a0 in favor of a national path to nuclear\u00a0 capabilities.\u201d [2]<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Can it therefore be considered that the risks of\u00a0 nuclear proliferation are higher in Asia than in\u00a0 Europe, given that the latter continent may feel <\/b>better protected from external threats thanks to\u00a0 the French and British nuclear arsenals capable of\u00a0 providing extended deterrence within NATO?\u00a0\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Undeniably, Asia is today the center of\u00a0 gravity of this \u201cnew nuclear age\u201d by virtue\u00a0 of the number of states concerned and the\u00a0 weapons developed.<\/p>\n

While historically strongly attached to non proliferation, Japan and South Korea are at the\u00a0 heart of major reflections on horizontal\u00a0 proliferation. Our era is clearly marked by a\u00a0 recomposition of the global nuclear order.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In the same article, Louis Gautier recalled:\u00a0 \u201cJapan, which refused to sign the TPNW \u2018so as\u00a0 not to insult the future,\u2019 is striving at all costs to\u00a0 revitalize the American nuclear guarantee. But\u00a0 its efforts are marked by considerable\u00a0 nervousness. The same is true of the less\u00a0 controlled calls by certain South Korean leaders\u00a0 in favor of a national path to nuclear\u00a0 capabilities.\u201d [3]<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

If military nuclear power is morally disqualified in\u00a0 the Japanese public sphere, associated with\u00a0 suffering and destruction, and giving rise to the\u00a0 doctrine of the three non-nuclear principles (not\u00a0 possessing, not producing, not introducing\u00a0 nuclear weapons), the strategic-military\u00a0 alliance with the United States underscores how\u00a0 structuring and political the issue of the\u00a0 \u201cAmerican umbrella\u201d remains within restricted\u00a0 circles.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

This is an issue of particular sensitivity in Japan,\u00a0 different from Korea, where deterrence is\u00a0 increasingly present in public debate without,\u00a0 however, leading to any significant change.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

This is all the more so since a poll conducted in\u00a0 February 2022 indicated that 71% of the South Korean\u00a0 population were in favor of their country acquiring\u00a0 nuclear weapons. Another poll conducted in May of\u00a0 the same year revealed that 70.2% of respondents\u00a0 supported the country\u2019s nuclearization, and that\u00a0 63.6% favored it even if such a decision could result in\u00a0 violating the NPT. The results of these polls appeared\u00a0 to respond to North Korea\u2019s development of\u00a0 weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to China\u2019s\u00a0 growing assertiveness as perceived in its regional\u00a0 environment. These factors have had the same\u00a0 impact on the Japanese debate over nuclearization,\u00a0 notably following statements by former Prime\u00a0 Minister Shinzo Abe, who publicly declared during his\u00a0 lifetime that Japan should seriously and urgently\u00a0 reflect on the issue of nuclear weapons, thus marking\u00a0 a fundamental break with the pacifist commitment <\/b>adopted by Japan after the Pacific War. What is your\u00a0 view?\u00a0\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Regional competition in Asia and international\u00a0 competition, combined with China\u2019s aggressive\u00a0 postures and \u201carsenalization,\u201d as well as North\u00a0 Korean uncertainties, are generating a strong\u00a0 movement within South Korean and Japanese\u00a0 public opinion and, of course, within political\u00a0 landscapes. In other words, the militarization of\u00a0 Asia is fostering an evolution in mindsets and\u00a0 perceptions within the societies of Northeast\u00a0 Asian democracies. This is a fundamental issue\u00a0 for the next generation.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

While these societies are undergoing\u00a0 accelerated and structural aging, yet remain\u00a0 major industrial and innovative countries, they\u00a0 are reflecting on proliferation within the\u00a0 structuring framework of alliances with the\u00a0 American power. National security and foreign\u00a0 policy elements (in their neighborhood)\u00a0 permeate domestic politics. In January 2023,\u00a0 South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, criticized\u00a0 in Korea, called for a Korean path to deterrence.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

More generally, the recomposition of security\u00a0 architectures in the Indo-Pacific or Asia-Pacific,\u00a0 combined with militarization, is energizing this\u00a0 third nuclear age. In this regard, one may cite\u00a0 the various nuclear-powered submarine\u00a0 programs that Australia is expected to acquire\u00a0 under AUKUS or that South Korea is pursuing.\u00a0 This reflects the strategic-military framing of\u00a0 China\u2019s rise and of its network of nuclear\u00a0 partners. In January 2026, South Korean\u00a0 President Lee Jae-myung stated that North\u00a0 Korea would produce enough nuclear material\u00a0 each year to assemble up to 20 atomic\u00a0 weapons, \u201cwarning of a \u2018global danger\u2019 if\u00a0 nothing is done to resolve the issue.\u201d<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

More recently, the North Korean regime, at the\u00a0 Party Congress, stated that it was \u201cclarifying\u00a0 plans for the next stage aimed at strengthening\u00a0 the country\u2019s nuclear deterrent force.\u201d Indeed,\u00a0 the continuation of North Korea\u2019s nuclear and\u00a0 ballistic program structures South Korea\u2019s\u00a0 security architecture. Unlike in Japan, deterrence\u00a0 fuels broader debates within Korean public\u00a0 opinion and restricted circles alike. Political\u00a0 cleavages are clear, and the debates remain\u00a0 legitimate.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The trauma of the two bombs in Japan remains\u00a0 fundamental, both within Japanese society\u00a0 (notably among the survivors\u2014the hibakusha),\u00a0 in public opinion, and in the political landscape.\u00a0 The discreet debates on nuclear matters in\u00a0 Japan reflect an evolution\/aggravation of the archipelago\u2019s strategic and security\u00a0 environment, in which China\u2019s militarization,\u00a0 North Korean proliferation, and Russian postures\u00a0 (blackmail, threats, and theater sanctuarization\/Ukraine) form the pillars of the defense\u00a0 apparatus.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n

Deterrence does not prevent crises and war, but\u00a0 the ultima ratio makes it possible to contain\u00a0 escalation, prevent runaway dynamics, and\u00a0 rationalize escalation between two nuclear\u00a0 powers. While the \u201cthird nuclear age\u201d is\u00a0 particularly at work in Asia, and more generally in\u00a0 the world, doctrinal evolutions in the context of\u00a0 competition and regional tensions will shape\u00a0 strategic balances over the next ten years as a\u00a0 lever of political influence and power.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

On 4 February 2026, Russia declared that it no\u00a0 longer considered itself bound by the New START\u00a0 Treaty limiting the number of strategic nuclear\u00a0 launchers and deployed nuclear warheads on those\u00a0 launchers, while also establishing a new\u00a0 verification system for compliance with the\u00a0 Treaty\u2019s provisions. Can it be said that the Russian\u00a0 decision, without directly threatening Asia,\u00a0 degrades the global deterrence ecosystem,\u00a0 thereby making Asia\u2014already fragile\u2014more\u00a0 unstable, more unpredictable and potentially more\u00a0 nuclear?\u00a0\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Signed in 2010 and entering into force in 2011, the\u00a0 New START Treaty (New Strategic Arms\u00a0 Reduction Treaty) had been extended once in\u00a0 2021 for five years, setting its expiration date at 5\u00a0 February 2026. With the expiration of New START<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\u2014the last bilateral nuclear arms-control\u00a0 agreeement between the United States and\u00a0 Russia, which entered into force in 2011\u2014the legal\u00a0 constraint limiting their strategic arsenals\u00a0 disappears. This poses a major challenge for\u00a0 international security, as there is currently\u00a0 neither an extension nor a clear successor to\u00a0 this treaty. The two nuclear powers are\u00a0 nevertheless discussing a resumption of\u00a0 strategic dialogue in order to avoid an arms\u00a0 race and maintain a minimum level of\u00a0 transparency, but negotiations are fragile and\u00a0 difficult.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The situation is made more complex by:<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The absence of verification mechanisms for\u00a0 several years,<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Divergences over the modalities of a future\u00a0 agreement,<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The emergence of other nuclear powers\u00a0 (such as China) outside the traditional\u00a0 bilateral framework.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

For several years, other agreements have\u00a0 disappeared (such as the INF Treaty on\u00a0\u00a0intermediate-range nuclear forces in 2019). With\u00a0 the end of New START, there is no longer any\u00a0 major bilateral treaty limiting strategic nuclear\u00a0 weapons between Washington and Moscow\u2014an unprecedented situation since the 1970s. This\u00a0 means that strategic dialogue becomes more\u00a0 difficult, Europe finds itself more exposed to\u00a0 nuclear tensions, and the credibility of the global\u00a0 non-proliferation regime weakens. The logic of\u00a0 deterrence becomes more \u201ccompetitive\u201d again.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

This may also push other nuclear powers\u00a0 (notably China) to accelerate their own\u00a0 programs. Transparency disappears, leading to\u00a0 increased mistrust, risks of misinterpretation,\u00a0 and strategic tensions. In this respect, it should\u00a0 be recalled that at the heart of strategic rivalry\u00a0 and competition between the United States and\u00a0 China, the United States recently claimed that\u00a0 Beijing may have conducted at least one secret\u00a0 nuclear test in 2020.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In April 2020, the U.S. Department of State\u00a0 published its annual report to Congress on\u00a0 compliance with arms-control agreements. It\u00a0 noted intense activity at the Lop Nor nuclear test\u00a0 site (Xinjiang province) and mentioned the\u00a0 possibility that China may have conducted or\u00a0 prepared low-yield nuclear tests, raising\u00a0 questions about compliance with international\u00a0 norms. Beijing firmly denied this, describing the\u00a0 report as \u201cfalse accusations\u201d and denouncing\u00a0 their politicization. China\u2019s last nuclear test dates\u00a0 back to the summer of 1996. Beijing is reported\u00a0 to have conducted 45 nuclear tests between\u00a0 1964 and 1996.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Neither the United States nor China has ratified\u00a0 the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty\u00a0 (CTBT), which is therefore not in force for them.\u00a0 Moreover, the notion of \u201clow yield\u201d or \u201czero-yield\u201d\u00a0 is not defined in the CTBT, which complicates\u00a0 the interpretation of observations of activity at\u00a0 the site. Some experts suggest that the signals\u00a0 could simply result from subcritical tests\u00a0 (without a chain reaction), which are permitted\u00a0 under the CTBT.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

China has intensified its nuclear weapons\u00a0 simulation activities, notably under the\u00a0 mountains of Mianyang (Sichuan province), in\u00a0 order to improve the precision and\u00a0 sophistication of its arsenal, which fuels\u00a0 questions about its intentions.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Does Russia\u2019s unwillingness to extend the New\u00a0 START Treaty in its current form (bilateral: USA vs.\u00a0 Russia) not indirectly reflect the fact that nuclear\u00a0 proliferation and arms control no longer concern\u00a0 only the United States and Russia, but also other <\/b>countries, such as China, which is seeking to\u00a0 achieve parity with the United States? Could the\u00a0 non-renewal of the New START Treaty be both\u00a0 worrying in terms of reigniting the nuclear arms\u00a0 (and testing) race and realistic in light of this new\u00a0 situation, meaning that, theoretically, China (and\u00a0 even other Asian countries, North Korea in\u00a0 particular) should normally be included in the\u00a0 perspective of a hypothetical New START II\u00a0 Treaty? What is your view? Would China be ready\u00a0 to participate in negotiations for a new New START\u00a0 Treaty that would include it?\u00a0\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The obsolescence of the bilateral format is\u00a0 indeed a fait accompli. Russia justifies its refusal\u00a0 to extend the treaty \u201cas it stands\u201d with two\u00a0 arguments of strategic \u201crealism.\u201d<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

First, the emergence of China: Moscow and\u00a0 Washington agree (for once) that the rapid\u00a0 expansion of China\u2019s arsenal changes the\u00a0 equation. Beijing would be aiming, in the long\u00a0 term, at technical and political parity with the\u00a0 two major post\u2013Cold War nuclear powers.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Second, the inclusion of NATO. Any future treaty\u00a0 would now have to include the arsenals of\u00a0 France and the United Kingdom. According to\u00a0 Moscow, it is illogical to limit Russian weapons\u00a0 while ignoring the nuclear capabilities of the\u00a0 United States\u2019 European allies.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Is China ready to negotiate?\u00a0\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

For the time being, Beijing\u2019s answer is a\u00a0 categorical \u201cno,\u201d and this for several reasons:\u00a0 The asymmetry of stockpiles: Even though it is\u00a0 growing rapidly, China considers that its arsenal\u00a0 (estimated at around 700\u2013800 warheads in\u00a0 2026) remains well below the approximately\u00a0 1,550 deployed warheads (and the thousands in\u00a0 reserve) of the United States and Russia. For\u00a0 Beijing, it is up to the two giants to drastically\u00a0 reduce their stockpiles before it sits down at the\u00a0 table.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The doctrine of \u201cMinimum Deterrence\u201d: China\u00a0 refuses to disclose its exact numbers, arguing\u00a0 that secrecy is the key to its survival in the face\u00a0 of more powerful adversaries. Accepting a New\u00a0 START II-type treaty would imply intrusive on-site\u00a0\u00a0inspections, which Beijing considers a threat to\u00a0 its national security.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Finally, the \u201cno first use\u201d position. China\u00a0 frequently invokes its commitment never to use\u00a0 nuclear weapons first in order to argue that it is\u00a0 not an \u201coffensive\u201d threat, unlike American and\u00a0 Russian doctrines. It is important to stress that\u00a0 the end of New START without a replacement\u00a0 creates a total legal vacuum, and this at several\u00a0 levels: Qualitative arms race. Without numerical\u00a0 limits, the focus shifts to disruptive technologies\u00a0 (hypersonic missiles, nuclear-powered\u00a0 underwater drones, AI integrated into command\u00a0 systems). Resumption of testing. Recent\u00a0 statements by the three major powers suggest\u00a0 a temptation to resume actual nuclear testing\u00a0 to validate these new technologies, which would\u00a0 definitively bury the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Finally, instability in Asia. North Korea, as you\u00a0 noted, observes this deterioration of\u00a0 international norms as a \u201cgreen light\u201d to pursue\u00a0 its own program, while Japan and South Korea,\u00a0 as previously mentioned, are experiencing\u00a0 debates at various levels regarding deterrence.\u00a0 In addition, the combined arsenals of Pakistan\u00a0 and India further alter the strategic equation.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Recurring exchanges between Russia, China\u00a0 and Iran on nuclear issues (notably in 2025)\u00a0 within a diplomatic framework reflect a renewed\u00a0 web of strategic porosity. Although North Korea\u00a0 does not formally participate in these\u00a0 diplomatic forums, the continuation of its\u00a0 nuclear program and its rapprochement with\u00a0 Russia confirm nuclear multipolarity. It remains\u00a0 the case that, in the missile domain, exchanges\u00a0 with North Korea are known and documented.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Nuclear multipolarity is increasingly structuring,\u00a0 making our time the new nuclear age.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[1]\u00a0https:\/\/legrandcontinent.eu\/fr\/2025\/12\/15\/le-nouvel age-nucleaire\/<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[2]\u00a0https:\/\/legrandcontinent.eu\/fr\/2025\/12\/15\/le-nouvel age-nucleaire\/<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[3]\u00a0https:\/\/legrandcontinent.eu\/fr\/2025\/12\/15\/le-nouvel age-nucleaire\/<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

*****<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n
\n

Emmanuel V\u00e9ron is a professor at the \u00c9cole de guerre and a specialist in contemporary Asia. He holds a PhD in\u00a0 geography, is a specialist in contemporary China and international relations, affiliated with the UMR IFRAE (French\u00a0 Research Institute on East Asia), and an associate research fellow at INALCO (National Institute for Oriental\u00a0 Languages and Civilizations) and at the \u00c9cole Navale.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
This publication reflects the views and opinions of the individual authors. As a platform dedicated to the sharing of information and ideas, our objective is to highlight a diversity of perspectives. Accordingly, the opinions expressed herein should not be interpreted as those of the Fondation France-Asie or its affiliates.<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Emmanuel V\u00e9ron   Jean-Rapha\u00ebl Peytregnet: Eighty years after the\u00a0 United States dropped atomic bombs on\u00a0 Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we are witnessing a\u00a0 resurgence of crises pitting\u2014or risking pitting\u2014\u00a0nuclear powers against one another (Russia vs. the\u00a0 United States, India vs. Pakistan, China vs. the\u00a0 United States\/Taiwan, North Korea vs. the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":6951,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"episode_type":"","audio_file":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"","date_recorded":"","explicit":"","block":"","filesize_raw":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[118],"tags":[],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7166"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7166"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7166\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7226,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7166\/revisions\/7226"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6951"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7166"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7166"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7166"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}