{"id":7512,"date":"2026-05-07T09:00:51","date_gmt":"2026-05-07T09:00:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/?p=7512"},"modified":"2026-05-07T14:34:19","modified_gmt":"2026-05-07T14:34:19","slug":"the-editorial-of-may-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/the-editorial-of-may-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"The editorial of May 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"
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By Jean-Rapha\u00ebl Peytregnet<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Twenty years ago, Asia was often described as “the world’s factory.” It produced at low cost, industrialized innovations from the West, and operated within a catch-up logic. That reading is now obsolete. Within a single generation, Asia has become a central and sometimes dominant player in global innovation, driven by a spectacular rise in its research and development (R&D) capabilities and its strategic positioning in cutting-edge technologies.<\/p>\n

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This shift is first and foremost quantitative. Asia now concentrates the bulk of global innovation momentum.<\/p>\n

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In 2024, even if their content would warrant closer scrutiny, more than 3.7 million patents were filed worldwide, the majority in Asia, with China alone accounting for nearly half of all filings. In the specific field of artificial intelligence (AI), the dominance is even more pronounced: 64.7% of global AI patents are Chinese, compared to 18.3% for the United States. By comparison, Europe remains well behind (3% of global patents), both in volume and in industrial transformation capacity.<\/p>\n

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But beyond these impressive volumes, it is the momentum that stands out. Over the past twenty-five years, the combined share of the United States and the European Union in AI scientific publications has fallen from over 57% to less than 25%, while China alone reached nearly 36% in 2025. This shift in the scientific center of gravity reflects a profound change: Asia is no longer catching up, it has become an engine of knowledge production.<\/p>\n

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This movement rests on a model distinct from that of the West. Where the United States favors disruptive innovation driven by startups and tech giants, Asia relies on a close articulation between a strategic state and industry. In China, public plans massively direct investment toward sectors deemed critical: AI, semiconductors, digital infrastructure. This coordination enables rapid, large-scale implementation of innovations. AI, for example, is integrated into concrete applications, logistics, finance, healthcare, security, at a speed few Western countries can match.<\/p>\n

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But reducing Asia to China alone would be incomplete.<\/p>\n

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Japan is a world leader in industrial robotics, precision sensors, advanced materials, and critical electronic components. Tokyo maintains a steady R&D effort of around \u20ac130 billion annually. Companies such as Toyota, Sony, and Fanuc (Fuji Automatic Numerical Control) exemplify this excellence.<\/p>\n

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In the field of AI, Japan takes a different approach from China or the United States. Less focused on digital platforms, the archipelago favors AI embedded in physical systems: robots, autonomous vehicles, and medical devices. This approach is part of a broader strategy, sometimes referred to as “Society 5.0,” aimed at integrating digital technologies across society as a whole, particularly to address structural challenges such as demographic ageing.<\/p>\n

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South Korea, for its part, represents perhaps one of the most accomplished models of integration between innovation, industry, and national strategy. With more than 4.5% of its GDP devoted to R&D, it ranks at the very top globally. This investment intensity translates into a high concentration of technological capabilities in key sectors: semiconductors, displays, telecommunications, and AI.<\/p>\n

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Seoul also stands out for its ability to deploy new technologies rapidly. South Korea was among the first countries to roll out 5G at scale, and is investing heavily in AI-related infrastructure. It aspires to become one of the world’s leading AI hubs, with coordinated public and private investment and strong involvement from the education sector.<\/p>\n

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Unlike the Chinese model, which is more centralized, or the American model, which is more entrepreneurial, the Korean model is built on close coordination between the state and large conglomerates, including Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix, global leaders in electronic memory, enabling fast and efficient execution. This capacity for strategic alignment is one of its key strengths.<\/p>\n

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It is within this ecosystem that one finds a player that is often discreet but absolutely crucial: Taiwan. This territory alone plays a decisive role in the global technology economy. It accounts for 60% of global semiconductor production and more than 90% of the most advanced chips, which are indispensable for AI applications, smartphones, and military infrastructure.<\/p>\n

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The heart of this dominance rests on a single company: TSMC. This industrial giant produces the most sophisticated chips for companies such as Apple, NVIDIA, and AMD. By comparison, neither the United States nor Europe currently has an equivalent capability at the most advanced technology nodes (3nm and beyond). This dependency places Taiwan at the center of a major geopolitical issue: controlling semiconductors means, to a large extent, controlling the global digital economy.<\/p>\n

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But one of the most interesting and most ambivalent cases is that of India. Often presented as the next great technological power, it embodies both the potential and the limits of the Asian model.<\/p>\n

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On one hand, the indicators are impressive. India ranks among the top three countries in the world by volume of scientific publications and possesses an enormous talent pool. Its AI market could reach nearly \u20ac25 billion as early as 2025, with estimated demand for one million professionals by 2026. The country has also launched ambitious public programs, including a package of more than \u20ac10 billion for research and innovation and a dedicated national AI strategy.<\/p>\n

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Yet behind these ambitions, the weaknesses are significant. India devotes only 0.65% of its GDP to R&D, far behind China (over 2.4%) or the United States (around 3.5%). This structural weakness is reflected in outcomes: between 2017 and 2024, India accounted for just 0.33% of global AI patents, with approximately 2,100 patents in total, compared to hundreds of thousands for China.<\/p>\n

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Moreover, the Indian ecosystem remains defined by a paradox: a strong pool of talent, but a limited capacity to transform those skills into disruptive innovation. Fewer than 10% of companies have deployed AI at scale, and the majority remains at the experimental stage. The country captures barely 1.3% of global funding in this area, which constrains the emergence of foundational technologies.<\/p>\n

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This contrast reveals a broader fault line within Asia. On one side, powers such as China and South Korea, capable of dominating entire segments of the technology value chain. On the other, countries like India or certain Southeast Asian states, which are progressing rapidly but remain more positioned in adaptation, services, or implementation than in disruptive innovation.<\/p>\n

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Faced with this Asian rise, the West nonetheless retains certain structural advantages. The United States still largely dominates foundational technologies, particularly in AI models, advanced software, and computing architectures. Its ability to attract talent and fund extremely high-risk projects remains unmatched. Europe, for its part, retains strong scientific capacity but suffers from an industrialization deficit and fragmentation that hinders the emergence of technological champions.<\/p>\n

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What is taking shape today is therefore not unilateral dominance, but a deeply reconfigured technological world. Asia now concentrates critical mass, in terms of scientific output, patents, and industrialization. The United States retains a qualitative lead in disruptive innovation. And Europe is attempting to carve out a role as a normative and scientific power.<\/p>\n

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In this configuration, the central challenge is no longer simply to innovate, but to master the entire value chain: from fundamental research to industrialization, including infrastructure and data. On this front, Asia holds decisive assets: massive markets, strong strategic coordination, and rapid execution capacity.<\/p>\n

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But these strengths come with major challenges. Persistent dependence on certain critical technologies, growing geopolitical tensions, and limitations in radical innovation could slow this momentum. India, in particular, illustrates this dilemma: rich in human and economic potential, it will need to significantly increase its R&D investment and strengthen its innovation ecosystem to avoid remaining a mere testing ground.<\/p>\n

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At its core, global technological competition is no longer played out solely between nations, but between models. The West invents, Asia industrializes, and certain territories like Taiwan become critical links without which no system can function.<\/p>\n

In this unstable equilibrium, one thing is certain: global technological power has shifted eastward. But it remains deeply interdependent. And that may be where both its greatest strength and its principal vulnerability lie.<\/p>\n

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*****<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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A career diplomat who studied Chinese studies in France and then worked in development aid as an international expert for UNESCO in Laos (1988-1991), Jean-Rapha\u00ebl PEYTREGNET has held positions including Consul General of France in Guangzhou (2007-2011) and Beijing (2015-2018), as well as in Mumbai\/Bombay from 2011 to 2015. He was responsible for Asia at the Center for Analysis, Forecasting, and Strategy (CAPS) attached to the office of the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs (2018-2021) and finally Special Advisor to the Director for Asia-Oceania (2021-2023).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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By Jean-Rapha\u00ebl Peytregnet   Twenty years ago, Asia was often described as “the world’s factory.” It produced at low cost, industrialized innovations from the West, and operated within a catch-up logic. That reading is now obsolete. Within a single generation, Asia has become a central and sometimes dominant player in […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":7460,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"episode_type":"","audio_file":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"","date_recorded":"","explicit":"","block":"","filesize_raw":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[118],"tags":[],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7512"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7512"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7512\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7571,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7512\/revisions\/7571"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/7460"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7512"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7512"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fondationfranceasie.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7512"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}