The Editorial of February 2026

By Jean-Raphaël Peytregnet

The National Security Strategy (NSS) published by the White House in  November 2025 has had significant  repercussions in the Asian region. This  document comes in a context already marked  by renewed Sino-American tensions, strategic  realignments, and a reconfiguration of regional  alliances. The NSS reviews the main  developments observed in Asia: persistent and  heightened tensions surrounding Taiwan,  regional diplomatic dynamics, the growing role  of allies, economic impacts, perceptions among  Southeast Asian countries, and, finally, the  adaptation of national strategies in an uncertain  geopolitical environment.

Following a series of U.S. announcements— including significant arms sales to Taiwan  (amounting to USD 11 billion, announced on  December 18, 2025) and American and  Japanese statements on the strategic  importance of the Taiwan Strait—China  intensified its military exercises around the  island for two consecutive days (December 29– 30, 2025).

Maneuvers dubbed Justice Mission 2025  (Zhengyi shiming-2025 yanxi) involved  several dozen Chinese naval vessels and  aircraft, including artillery strikes and  missile launches in areas closer to Taiwan  than ever before.

Regional media interpreted these maneuvers as  implicit attempts to intimidate Taipei and, in  particular, Japan, following statements by  Japan’s new Prime Minister in support of the  island. In response to these exercises, several countries publicly expressed their “deep  concerns,” judging China’s actions to be  provocative and potentially destabilizing for  regional and global security (see the joint  statement by G7 foreign ministers, including  France). For its part, the U.S. administration  reaffirmed the strategic importance of the Indo Pacific and its interests in the region.

Taken together, these events have heightened  the perceived risk of a military accident or a  major crisis around Taiwan, which could  escalate into a broader confrontation, even  though leaders on all sides continue to seek to  avoid open conflict.

In 2025, several important diplomatic initiatives  were observed. In a context where some  countries question U.S. commitment or fear a  reversal in Washington’s policy toward them,  they have sought to establish alternative  platforms for cooperation. Thus, a trilateral  meeting between South Korea, China, and  Japan was held for the first time after more than  a year-long hiatus. These countries emphasized  cooperation in areas such as health and civilian  technologies, thereby illustrating a desire to  revive regional dialogues independently of  Washington.

Similarly, strong activity was observed around  initiatives such as the Quad (Quadrilateral  Security Dialogue bringing together the United  States, Japan, India, and Australia), through  which these countries seek to harmonize their  security strategies without necessarily making  their entire policy dependent solely on the U.S. NSS.

China, in its own official statements, has  attempted to temper the escalation by calling  for cooperation and mutual respect, while firmly  defending its sovereignty and development  interests. A spokesperson from the Chinese  Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Waijiaobu) notably  explained that Beijing wished to work with the  United States to promote a stable and  sustainable relationship, while managing their  differences constructively. Some Chinese  analysts also view the NSS as a signal to engage  in strategic dialogue with Washington.  Nevertheless, Beijing still perceives the NSS as a  containment strategy likely to increase tensions  and regional instability.

Unlike Japan, China, and Taiwan, India did not  officially react to the NSS. However, the  American document assigns India a strategic  role in the Indo-Pacific, positioning the  subcontinent as a partner to contain China’s  growing influence in the region. New Delhi views  this strategy as validation of its regional  importance, while allowing it to maintain its  policy of “strategic autonomy,” which avoids full  alignment with Washington.

The NSS indirectly encourages India to  strengthen its military capabilities—particularly  naval, air, and cyber—while modernizing its  infrastructure to secure critical supply chains.  On the economic front, the NSS offers New Delhi  the opportunity to become an alternative hub to  China-dependent supply chains, which should  stimulate its industrial and technological  development.

Japan’s increase in its defense budget to 2  percent of GDP, and Tokyo’s growing awareness  of its strategic role in the region—particularly in a  context of increasing rivalry with China—are in  line with the spirit of the NSS. Tokyo’s stated  objective is to reduce its dependence on U.S.  protection while remaining a pillar of the  regional security architecture. With the NSS,  Tokyo receives confirmation of the strategic  importance Washington assigns to it,  particularly regarding the defense of Taiwan,  which Japan considers vital to the stability of the  archipelago.

The NSS also comes at a time when Washington  is multiplying signals of support for Taipei,  thereby prompting U.S. allies to clarify their own  positions. This was the case on November 7,  2025, when Japan’s new Prime Minister stated  before the Diet that an attack by China on  Taiwan could constitute a “situation threatening  Japan’s survival.” Although the NSS does not go  into detail regarding Japanese statements, its  publication reinforces a strategic climate that makes such positions more politically and  militarily plausible.

South Korea, for its part, is investing heavily  in high-technology systems, particularly  precision missiles, while Australia continues  to expand its maritime and submarine  capabilities. These developments reflect a  significant strategic shift for states that  previously relied heavily on the United  States for their security.

Beyond national defense spending, concrete  cooperation has also been strengthened. The  Balikatan (“shoulder to shoulder”) 2025  exercises between the Philippines and the  United States were designed to be particularly  intensive, including, for example, the integration  of new coastal defense systems such as NMESIS  (Naval/Maritime Expeditionary Ship Interdiction  System, a mobile anti-ship system). These  exercises demonstrate a strengthening of  military ties that, despite overall strategic  uncertainty, continue to consolidate the U.S.  regional presence, particularly in areas close to  Taiwan and Southeast Asia.

U.S. policies linked to the NSS, particularly within  the framework of an “America First” agenda,  have had direct economic repercussions in Asia.  Sharp increases in U.S. tariffs have affected  ASEAN countries’ exports, leading to a downturn  in regional markets while strengthening China’s  economic influence.

Studies show that Chinese companies are  increasingly redirecting their exports toward  Asian partners—particularly Vietnam, Indonesia,  and Singapore—in order to circumvent U.S. trade  sanctions, thereby highlighting a reorganization  of global value chains and a strengthening of  intra-Asian economic ties.

Media outlets and analysts in Southeast Asia  have all noted that the NSS mentions the region  very little, appearing only twice in the main text.  This has led to the perception that Washington  prioritizes other geographic areas, such as Latin  America (the “Western Hemisphere”), and that  the U.S. capital uses ASEAN more as a  bargaining chip in its rivalry with China than as  an autonomous strategic partner. Such  strategic dilemmas may arise and push the  countries concerned to diversify their alliances.

In response, several Southeast Asian countries  have sought to diversify their strategies by  strengthening their own intra-regional  cooperation mechanisms, increasing bilateral  discussions with Beijing, Tokyo, and New Delhi,  and maintaining high-level dialogues with  Washington on specific issues such as maritime  security, high technology, and supply chains.

One of the most significant consequences of  the NSS is the intensification of public and  think-tank debates on security in Asia, the  role of the United States, independent  national strategies, and ways to ensure  regional stability without exclusive  dependence on Washington.

These debates focus in particular on issues such  as burden sharing, national sovereignty, the  integration of advanced military technologies,  and the management of Sino-American rivalry  so as to minimize the risks of accidental  escalation.

Since the publication of the NSS, Asia has  witnessed a combination of strategic  realignments, heightened tensions, and efforts  toward regional autonomy.

The Taiwan issue remains a focal point of  tensions, with more visible Chinese military  exercises prompting political reactions from U.S.  allies. Traditional U.S. allies (Japan, South Korea,  the Philippines, Thailand, as well as Taiwan) are  strengthening their military capabilities or  reaffirming their commitments to Washington,  sometimes at the cost of intense domestic  debates. The NSS acts as a clear signal that Asia  must be more proactive and less dependent on  the United States for its security. In Southeast  Asia, countries are seeking to maintain a  balance among the major powers while  reassessing their economic and strategic  priorities.

The United States emphasizes the role of the  Indo-Pacific in its overall strategy, which ensures  a certain level of deterrence against China and  North Korea. Finally, the region is marked by a  deep strategic debate on how to manage  uncertainty surrounding U.S. commitment and  the rise of China as a global power.

These trends show that, although the NSS may  be perceived as a U.S. policy document  centered on American interests—signaling an  implicit revival of the Monroe Doctrine, whereby  Washington places territorial security and  domestic economic resilience at the core of its  doctrine—its effects in Asia are concrete,  complex, and multidimensional.

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