Japon-USA: a summit like no other

Article by CHEN Yo-Jung

Ms. Sanae Takaichi, Japan's new head of government, made a highly noticed official visit to Washington on March 19th as the first leader of a G7 country to meet President Donald Trump following the opening of hostilities launched by the latter against Iran.

A butterfly fluttering toward a lit candle

The visit was originally set within a normal bilateral context aimed at reconfirming the Japan-US alliance following Ms. Takaichi's arrival at the head of the Japanese government last November. Since the end of the war, such a visit constitutes an unavoidable ritual for any new Japanese leader.

Beyond the confirmation of the sacred alliance between the two countries, the Prime Minister's program included cooperation projects and Japanese investments totaling 550 billion dollars to which Tokyo had committed itself last year vis-à-vis Washington within the framework of tariff negotiations, including the launch of cooperation in the field of shipbuilding and more specifically in the sector of critical materials, including rare earths. Added to this was Trump's cherished project of Japan purchasing Alaskan oil. Furthermore, faced with a worrying deterioration in its relations with its large neighbor following remarks made last November by Ms. Takaichi on Taiwan, the Japanese side hoped to use this visit to consult with its main American ally on a common position vis-à-vis China ahead of President Trump's postponed visit to Beijing on May 14 and 15, 2026.

However, the nature of the visit took an unexpected turn following the hostilities opened by America and Israel against Iran on February 28, barely two weeks before Ms. Takaichi's departure for Washington. This war of aggression, with its grave repercussions for the entire world and above all for Japan, whose 93% of energy resource imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz, threatened to completely change the stakes of the visit.

In particular, Trump's demand addressed to his allies, including Europeans and Japan, to take part in a military operation to unblock the Strait of Hormuz, placed Tokyo before a trilemma: between its strategic loyalty toward America, its obligation to maintain good relations with oil-producing countries in the Middle East including Iran, and above all its legal obligation, under Article 9 of its "pacifist" Constitution, to abstain from any armed action, notably in an ongoing international conflict.

On the eve of Ms. Takaichi's visit, Trump was still nursing a dark anger toward NATO allies who had all refused to take upon themselves the task of securing maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, rather than leaving this responsibility primarily to the United States. Considering the irascible behavior of the White House occupant, Japanese public opinion was convinced that its Prime Minister, like a butterfly fluttering toward a lit candle, was going to singe her wings by being unable to give her consent to the deployment of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in the Strait of Hormuz, at the risk of violating the archipelago's Constitution [4].

It should be recalled that Japan has already been obliged on several occasions in the past to lend its support to "American wars" in various non-combat forms, at the limit of its constitutional constraints: a massive financial contribution of 13 billion dollars to the Gulf War in 1990, maritime refueling of American ships during the war in Afghanistan in 2002, construction of infrastructure in Iraq by the JSDF from 2003 to 2009. In the case of Iraq, Tokyo had to promulgate a new special law to allow its Self-Defense Forces to leave national territory in order to build hospitals and roads in Iraq, but only on the condition that this be far from the theaters of military operations.

An unexpected success through embraces and flattery

To general surprise, viewed from the Japanese side, the March 19th meeting at the White House between Ms. Takaichi and her American host proved, in the end, a clear success.

According to some Japanese observers, the Japanese Prime Minister managed to escape miraculously, without having to submit to Trump's pressure. The surprise was all the greater as Donald Trump seemed, without losing his temper as is customary, to have come around to the arguments of his interlocutor, who patiently and in detail explained to him "what Japan could and could not do within the country's legal framework."

This fact alone led all political observers in Japan, including journalist Kenji Minemura of the daily Sankei Shimbun (a specialist in Chinese political issues, Asian security and geopolitics), to award this Japan-US summit a score of 95/100 in favor of Sanae Takaichi.

With the thorny question of Japan's involvement in the Strait of Hormuz thus set aside (pending Trump changing his mind, which he seems to have done on April 6 by complaining again that Japan "does nothing to help us"), the Japanese side was able to address with the American president the subjects previously set on the agenda. For Japanese public opinion, which had in mind the stormy discussions at the White House between its occupant and leaders of other countries, this smooth conduct of the talks constituted in itself a success to be credited to Ms. Takaichi.

According to Japanese participants in this discussion, Trump seemed to appreciate in particular the Japanese offer to purchase Alaskan oil as well as the package of Japanese energy and industrial projects within the framework of the Japan-US agreement (estimated at 550 billion dollars in total), covering for the second tranche an amount of 73 billion dollars, focused on the development of small modular nuclear reactors (40 billion dollars) and natural gas power plants (33 billion dollars) spread across several sites (Tennessee and Alabama for the reactors, Pennsylvania and Texas for the power plants). It seemed to them that the American president, isolated from his traditional European allies, wanted to make Japan a model partner distinguishing itself "from those ungrateful NATO members." This would explain his restraint in exerting too much pressure on the Japanese leader.

But the success achieved by Ms. Takaichi was not without its controversies.

Controversy 1: A diplomacy of flattery deemed excessive.

This unexpected success was attributed to a sense of flattery, described as "personal charm" on the part of the Japanese leader by the New York Times, but judged crude, shameful and obsequious by many of her fellow citizens. Liberal-leaning dailies, foremost among them the Asahi Shimbun, criticized the "lack of dignity" on the part of a head of government.

Even if 69% of Japanese applauded their Prime Minister for having managed to navigate what was a priori a difficult summit with a feared interlocutor, a significant portion of Japanese public opinion expressed irritation and embarrassment at seeing their leader behave "like a bar hostess striving to please the customer in a complete absence of the dignity that in principle befits a head of government": more embraces and hugs than usual, exaggerated praise, uninhibited dancing at the official dinner, complicity with her host in ridiculing former President Joe Biden, and so on.

Speaking on a YouTube program, Hama Noriko, economist and university professor known for her critical analyses of contemporary Japanese economic policy, said she was overwhelmed with shame to see her Prime Minister display before the entire world such a lack of restraint and dignity. For his part, Tanaka Hitoshi, former senior diplomat and now international relations analyst specializing in Asian diplomacy, questioned whether it was normal for the leader of a sovereign country to rely on her "feminine charm" to negotiate with the American president.

In a country where 80% oppose Trump's "illegal war" against Iran, Ms. Takaichi's flattery shocked many of her fellow citizens, particularly when she declared, with a straight face, to the man who had just launched a war against Iran: "Donald, you are the only person capable of bringing peace and prosperity to the world and I am here to support you in this endeavor." For Saruta Sayo, president of the think tank "New Diplomacy Initiative," this "ignominious" declaration of support for a war deemed illegal from every standpoint, even if intended to flatter a difficult interlocutor, could well risk one day turning like a boomerang against Japan.

Despite all these negative reactions provoked by what Valérie Niquet, an expert on strategic issues in Asia, calls "the art of the hug" of Ms. Takaichi, the majority of political commentators in Japan are rather of the opinion that the visit was a great overall success.

They agree in estimating that Ms. Takaichi's flattery, however annoying and humiliating it may be, was the only possible recourse for a country like Japan to disarm an interlocutor as difficult as Trump and thus guarantee its national interests. Agreeing with Kenji Minemura cited above, political journalist Iwata Akiko particularly appreciates the fact that the Japanese leader very successfully pulled off the diplomatic acrobatics of "saying no to Trump without having to utter the word no." For his part, Sato Yu, former diplomat and widely known geopolitics essayist, admires the way Ms. Takaichi adroitly sidestepped President Trump's wrath "by opposing him with a 'no' (on the immediate deployment of Japanese armed forces) without however excluding the possibility of a 'yes' in the future."

Controversy 2: Did someone say "Pearl Harbor"?

The Japan-US summit of March 19 was marked by a brief remark, deemed out of place toward Japan, let slip by President Trump during the press conference.

When asked by a Japanese journalist why he had not warned his allies before launching attacks against Iran, the American president replied: "Who knows better about surprise than Japan? Ok? Why didn't you tell me about Pearl Harbor? Ok? Right?" This response was seen by Western media as potentially embarrassing for Tokyo, especially in a context supposedly aimed at reinforcing the American-Japanese alliance, even if delivered in the ironic and customarily joking tone that distinguishes Trump.

But the reaction of Japanese media and commentators to the American head of state's remark was globally more measured and cautious than in part of the Western press, with several important nuances however.

Major Japanese media outlets such as NHK, Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun mostly reported Trump's "unfortunate" remark factually, avoiding strong emotional judgments in their headlines and instead emphasizing the overall diplomatic context of the visit, namely security and the US-Japan alliance.

International relations specialists generally stressed that Trump often used simplified historical references to speak about military strategy, that what mattered diplomatically was US-Japan cooperation and not the remark itself, and that the official Japanese reaction had to remain neutral to avoid any unnecessary friction.

In short, in Japan, the reaction was above all cautious, factual and diplomatic, with a degree of discomfort but without any major controversy, in contrast to certain more critical readings in the Western press.

It was moreover not the first time Trump had engaged in such an exercise. Already in 2018, Trump reportedly said to his interlocutor at the time, Shinzo Abe: "I remember Pearl Harbor," in the context of a tense discussion on trade and the American deficit.

A portion of Japanese commentators, including former diplomats and editorial writers, was however more critical of the Prime Minister, judging that the failure to react to such remarks (even if she showed a degree of discomfort on screen) could give an impression of imbalance in the bilateral relationship. Some even spoke of a posture deemed too "passive" in the face of a remark perceived as out of place.

Others did not fail to draw the contrast with Chancellor Merz, who had managed to put Donald Trump in his place when the latter evoked Germany's Nazi past before him during the anniversary of D-Day on June 6, 2025. Critics from the media, including the TV Asahi channel, were nonetheless obliged to admit at the same time that in such circumstances the Prime Minister's regrettable silence was inevitable given the importance of prioritizing a cordial relationship with the current occupant of the White House.

Furthermore, a portion of opinion expressed on social networks placed the blame rather on the Japanese journalist whose question had led Trump to make this clumsy response.

The contrast between the phlegmatic reactions of the Japanese and the outcries of the foreign press can be explained by different cultural codes, diplomatic priorities and media systems.

Japanese society traditionally attaches itself to "wa" (和), the spirit of harmony and restraint, which leads to avoiding overly direct and vehement reactions, especially when it concerns the United States, Japan's major ally, protector and in some sense overlord since the end of the Second World War. Openly contesting a superior authority, in this case Washington, is simply something that is not done in Japan, especially at the official level.

Pragmatism is an old tradition in Japan. This pragmatism led it in 1868 to pass overnight from the status of a feudal country to that of a modern imperial power. It allowed it in 1945 to welcome without any resistance the military occupation of the former American enemy. Today, this pragmatism leads the Japanese to weigh on one hand the advantage of an emotional and confrontational reaction to Trump's brief remark, at the risk of alienating him, against on the other hand the benefits of maintaining a cordial relationship with the American strongman. The choice appears obvious.

Even if they may have been embarrassed by the American president's tasteless "joke," the majority of Japanese find even more embarrassing the obsequiously flattering behavior of their own Prime Minister before the White House occupant. Economist Hama Noriko, for example, says she is more offended by the inelegance of Ms. Takaichi's flattery than by the all things considered stupid joke of an equally inelegant American leader.

For many young Japanese, the Second World War and the controversy of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor are now nothing more than a distant memory. They are part of that unfortunate history of their ancestors with which they no longer identify. There is even a not insignificant proportion of young people who are unaware that their country was once at war with America. Asking them to express indignation at Trump's dubious Pearl Harbor joke is therefore a long stretch.

Controversy 3: What about Article 9 of the Constitution?

It became evident that the most precious gain collected by Sanae Takaichi at this Japan-US summit was her success in dodging the American president's pressure for Japan's entry into the war against Iran. She owes this success to Article 9 of Japan's "pacifist" Constitution, which the Prime Minister managed to make her American interlocutor understand, who declared after the meeting: "I understand that Japan has its own particular constraints." In Japan, several commentators went so far as to say that Ms. Takaichi had "saved her skin thanks to Article 9."

This is not without irony when one knows that the Prime Minister, an ultra-nationalist and advocate of Japanese rearmament, is precisely known for her hostility toward that very Article 9. She heads a party that has always called (unsuccessfully until now) for the revision of the "pacifist" Japanese Constitution imposed 80 years ago by the American occupation forces. The LDP (the ruling party) has always wanted to modify, if not completely eliminate, Article 9 so that Japan could formally equip itself with a military power daring to take the name of "army" instead of "Japanese Self-Defense Forces," and which could legally participate in conflicts beyond its borders such as the one currently being waged by the United States with Iran.

There has been since the end of the Second World War a national debate in Japan between, on one hand, liberals who defend the pacifism made possible by Article 9 and, on the other, nationalists who wish to be rid of it and thus eliminate the legal ambiguity deemed troublesome for the country's national defense.

Upon Ms. Takaichi's return to Japan, this debate resumed with renewed vigor.

Liberal and pacifist forces, represented by media such as the daily Asahi Shimbun, are satisfied that Article 9 allowed Japan to avoid being drawn into a war they consider undesirable. As for the nationalists, they reproach this article of the Constitution for having, once again, prevented the archipelago from honoring its obligations as a faithful ally of the United States, which in their eyes constitutes yet another dishonorable stain on the country.

Traditionally, a majority of Japanese favor the maintenance of Article 9, which has allowed Japan until now to be one of the rare countries in the world never to have fired a single shot in any conflict for 80 years. But this feeling seems to be evolving in recent years following the rise in the perceived Chinese and North Korean threat and the progression of xenophobic sentiment within Japanese society.

In this context, Ms. Takaichi, who now commands an absolute majority in the lower house (House of Representatives) of the Diet (316 seats out of 465), seems well on her way to achieving what none of her predecessors was able to do: launching the long and difficult process toward a very first amendment of the Constitution in the history of this country.

Conclusion

The holding of a Japan-US summit is such a commonplace routine that it generally only interests Japanese public opinion alone, with very few reactions in the American or international press.

The most recent one, on March 19, 2026, between Sanae Takaichi and Donald Trump, contrary to its predecessors, attracted international attention, in a particular geopolitical context, due to a brief remark by the White House chief and the absence of reaction from his Japanese interlocutor, who was more inclined to show deference toward her host.

While the two parties concluded mutually beneficial agreements on industrial cooperation, investment and defense matters, the attention paid on both sides to the American verbal slip and to the excessively polite Japanese conduct led to reflections on the cultural differences and sensitivities between Japanese and Westerners.

One learns notably from this Japan-US summit that a misplaced remark about Japan that causes the Western press to cry scandal leaves the Japanese, by contrast, unmoved. And one observes that the Japanese Prime Minister's excess of flattery toward her American host is appreciated as "personal charm" on her part by the New York Times, while it irritates Japanese public opinion, which finds it by contrast "vulgar" and "undignified."

So, to each their own culture and way of interpreting things.

[1] See In Japan, a woman at the helm! – So what?, Nouveaux Regards sur l’Asie, March 2026.

[2] Since 2019, following U.S. sanctions against Iran, Japan is no longer directly dependent on the country for its oil and gas imports. However, it remains strongly indirectly dependent on Tehran, as approximately 95% of its oil comes from the Middle East and transits through strategic areas influenced by Iran, such as the Strait of Hormuz.

[3] Article 9. Sincerely aspiring to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation, as well as the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as any other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

[4] The Japan Self-Defense Forces constitute a modern military, but are legally restricted by the Constitution of Japan to the defense of the national territory, reflecting the post-war pacifist framework.

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