Asia and the nuclear age: what future?

By Emmanuel Véron

Jean-Raphaël Peytregnet: Eighty years after the  United States dropped atomic bombs on  Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we are witnessing a  resurgence of crises pitting—or risking pitting— nuclear powers against one another (Russia vs. the  United States, India vs. Pakistan, China vs. the  United States/Taiwan, North Korea vs. the United  States/South Korea/Japan, etc.). In Asia in  particular, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear  Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and, by  2017, had developed the capability to strike U.S.  territory with an intercontinental ballistic missile  (ICBM). Beyond this example, how do you assess  the most recent developments in nuclear  proliferation in Asia?  

Emmanuel Véron: Asia stands as a singular case,  on the one hand, as you recall, because of the  use of the atomic weapon—the two bombs  dropped by the United States in August 1945 on  the cities of Hiroshima and then Nagasaki—and  on the other hand, today, because of the strong  concentration of strategic stakes and  international competition, in which the rise of  conventional arsenals and nuclear weapons  embodies the military-strategic pillars.  Historically, the vast Asia-Pacific region has  been the site of a series of American, British, and  French tests, notably in the South Pacific. The fastest and most significant proliferation is  indeed taking place in Asia.

Nuclear proliferation in Asia is an  expanding reality. The era of disarmament  is over.

First, China is doubling its arsenal, moving from  600 warheads in 2025 toward a horizon of 1,000  warheads in 2030, followed by North Korea, India  and Pakistan, which are also increasing their  stockpiles. In addition to this vertical proliferation  (the increase of arsenals of nuclear-armed  states), weapons modernization is also  underway throughout nuclear Asia.

Finally, horizontal proliferation—that is, the  accession of a new state to military nuclear  capability, either through its own means or  through the acquisition of means, techniques  and materials from a nuclear-armed state—is a  recurring strategic issue in Asia, particularly in  response to the vertical proliferation of China  and North Korea.

For more than a decade, the expansion of  arsenals has led analysts to examine  deterrence through the prism of a “new nuclear age” or “third nuclear age.” The third nuclear  age was characterized by Thérèse Delpech  (1948–2012) as an era of “strategic piracy,”  marked by the entry into the strategic  landscape of new nuclear-armed states, the  erosion of non-proliferation and arms-control  agreements, and the development of “non nuclear strategic weapons.”

These dynamics, centered on regional  tensions such as in South Asia (India– Pakistan) and East Asia (China–North  Korea), stimulate modernization and a  regional arms race, with risks of escalation  and a challenge to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The significant expansion of China’s arsenal,  reinforcing its position as a major nuclear power,  is leading to a recomposition of regional  defense policies (Japan, South Korea and India)  and a repositioning of the United States. North  Korea’s trajectory (with an estimated arsenal of  around 50 warheads), despite international  sanctions, points to a continuation of the  development of its ballistic and nuclear  capabilities, against the backdrop of the  Chinese and Russian equation, including  Pakistani links from the outset of its program.

Finally, India and Pakistan are engaged in a  historical and doctrinal rivalry, with Islamabad  seeking tactical deterrence vis-à-vis New Delhi,  which, for its part, focuses more on political  deterrence. According to SIPRI (Stockholm  International Peace Research Institute), there is  near parity in warhead numbers: 172 for India  and 170 for Pakistan. Neither country is a  signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation  of Nuclear Weapons.

Chinese proliferation and the Indo Pakistani strategic rivalry, today and  tomorrow, feed into one another.

Nuclear tensions in Asia (but also in the Middle  East, with Israel, as well as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and  even Turkey) are increasing, with dynamics  specific to each theater. We are indeed dealing  with a nuclear multipolarity that is more  unstable and more complex than deterrence/ proliferation during the Cold War and the  balance between the two blocs. Finally, it should  be recalled that the interest in civilian nuclear  energy among certain states in Asia (Southeast Asia) sometimes raises questions about the  boundary between civilian energy and potential  military programs, through the diversion of uses  and nuclear engineering. The difference  essentially lies in the level of uranium-235  enrichment. A civilian facility can produce and  be transformed into a military installation (cf.  the Iranian program).

The NPT commits the 190 countries (out of 193)  that are parties to it not to transfer nuclear  weapons to any country. Can it still be considered  an effective instrument to combat nuclear  proliferation when it failed to prevent India and  Pakistan—who have still not joined it to this day— from acquiring nuclear weapons in the 1990s?  According to the Pentagon and the Stockholm  International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),  China continues to develop its nuclear capabilities  and could have around 1,500 warheads by 2035  (approximately one third of the Russian arsenal),  compared to 500 in January 2024. The same applies  to India and Pakistan, which also appear to be  strengthening their nuclear arsenals with new  delivery systems under development, according to  a study conducted by the Nuclear Information  Project of the Federation of American Scientists.  

The NPT is the most widely supported arms control agreement. To date, four states have not  signed the NPT: India, South Sudan, Israel and  Pakistan. It should also be noted that North  Korea announced its intention to withdraw from  the NPT. The NPT was concluded in 1968 and  experienced a revival after 1991.

There is also the CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty) (1996), which aims to ban all  tests, and the TPNW (Treaty on the Prohibition of  Nuclear Weapons) (2021), which prohibits  possession and use, but is not yet in force due to  a lack of ratifications.

The NPT is not entirely obsolete. For example, U.S.  nuclear weapons reportedly located on  German, Italian, Turkish, Dutch and Belgian  territory (so-called DCA nations for Dual Capable Aircraft – gravity bombs) remain  under permanent U.S. control in accordance  with the NPT.

However, the deep international divergences  and ruptures, notably within the UN Security  Council, that is to say, the cohesion and  authority of the “nuclear directorate” to produce  norms of conduct and ensure compliance with  the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear  Weapons (NPT), are compromised. The  dismantling or denunciation of the principal  nuclear disarmament treaties is significant and  illustrates the international grammar of the past  one to two decades, whereas the NPT was reputed to be the cornerstone of global nuclear  security.

China’s growing geopolitical weight over  the past two decades, its sustained and  continuous “arsenalization” (conventional  and nuclear), are contributing to a  recomposition of international balances, of  a grammar dating back to the Cold War  and, as mentioned above, to the “new  nuclear age,” seeking, in the long term, a  form of parity with U.S. forces, if one adds  Russian, and even North Korean and/or  Pakistani arsenals.

American sources, notably from the Department  of War (formerly the Department of Defense,  before Trump II), recall a horizon of 1,500  warheads by 2035.

The modernization of China’s nuclear arsenal  has both accelerated and expanded in recent  years. Over the past five years, China has  significantly strengthened its nuclear  modernization program by deploying more  types and a greater number of nuclear  weapons than ever before.

China has continued to develop its three new  silo fields (Yumen in Gansu province, Hami in  Xinjiang province, Yulin near Ordos) for its solid fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), to  expand construction of new silos for its liquid fuel DF-5 ICBMs, to develop new variants of  ICBMs and advanced strategic delivery systems,  and has likely produced surplus warheads for  potential use on these systems once deployed.

China has also expanded its arsenal of DF-26  intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which  appear to have completely replaced the  medium-range DF-21 in its nuclear role. At sea,  China has modernized its Type 094 ballistic  missile submarines with the longer-range JL-3  ballistic missile. In addition, China has recently  reassigned an operational nuclear mission to its  bombers and is developing an air-launched  ballistic missile that could have nuclear  capabilities.

Overall, China’s nuclear expansion is one of the  largest and fastest among the nine nuclear armed states. The Bulletin of the Atomic  Scientists estimates that China has built up a  stockpile of approximately 600 nuclear warheads intended to be delivered by land based ballistic missiles, sea-based ballistic  missiles, and bombers.

Thus, the entire triad is being modernized. The  military parade of 3 September 2025 in Beijing  showcased the extent of a large part of its  modernizations and weapons. The Pentagon  indicated in 2024 that China’s nuclear stockpile  had “exceeded 600 operational warheads by  mid-2024” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2024).

However, Chinese warheads are not  “operational” in the same way as U.S. and  Russian nuclear warheads deployed on missiles  and at bomber bases; the vast majority of  Chinese warheads are reportedly stored  separately from their launchers.

India continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal,  with at least four new weapon systems and  several new launch platforms under  development to complement or replace existing  aircraft, land-based systems, and sea-based  systems capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Several of these systems are nearing  completion and are expected to be deployed  soon. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists  estimates that India may have produced  enough weapons-grade plutonium for 130 to 210  nuclear warheads, but has probably produced  only around 172, although the country’s warhead  stockpile is likely to grow.

India continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal  and to operationalize its nascent triad. The  Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimates that  India currently operates eight different systems  capable of delivering nuclear weapons: two  aircraft, five land-based ballistic missiles, and  one sea-based ballistic missile.

At least five other systems are under  development, most of which are expected to be  completed shortly and deployed with the armed  forces. Pakistan is pursuing the gradual  modernization of its nuclear arsenal, with  improved and new delivery systems, and a  rapidly expanding fissile material production  industry. Analysis of commercial satellite imagery  of construction at Pakistani army garrisons and  air bases reveals what appear to be newer  launchers and facilities, potentially linked to  Pakistan’s nuclear forces, although official  information on Pakistani nuclear units remains  scarce. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists  estimates that Pakistan possesses a stockpile of  approximately 170 nuclear warheads.

This estimate carries a margin of uncertainty  given the opaque nature of proliferation in this  strategic environment. With several new delivery  systems under development, four plutonium  production reactors, and an expanding uranium  enrichment infrastructure, Pakistan’s weapons  stockpile could further increase in the coming  years. The scale of this increase will depend on  several factors, notably the number of nuclear  launchers Pakistan plans to deploy, the  evolution of its nuclear strategy, and the growth  of India’s nuclear arsenal.

North Korea has made considerable  advances over the past two decades in  developing its nuclear arsenal as political  leverage against the United States.

Since 2006, it has conducted six nuclear tests,  updated its nuclear doctrine to emphasize the  irreversible role of nuclear weapons for its  national security, and continued deploying  various new missiles tested in flight from new  launch platforms. It is widely accepted that  North Korea possesses operational nuclear  warheads for its short- and medium-range  missiles, and possibly for its longer-range  missiles, although this latter capability has not  yet been publicly demonstrated.

According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,  uncertainty remains regarding the deployed  North Korean missiles equipped with an  operational nuclear capability. However, it is  acknowledged that the regime intends to equip  itself with an operational nuclear arsenal  capable of threatening targets in East Asia, the  United States, and Europe.

In 2021, Kim Jong-un announced several key  strategic objectives for North Korea’s nuclear  weapons program: 1) the production of very  large nuclear warheads; 2) the production of  smaller and lighter nuclear weapons for tactical  use; 3) the improvement of precision strike and  range capabilities; 4) the introduction of  hypersonic glide warheads; 5) the development  of solid-fuel intercontinental, submarine launched, and land-based ballistic rockets; and  6) the introduction of a nuclear-powered  submarine and a submarine-launched  strategic nuclear weapon.

Despite these clarifications, the real and precise  assessment of the regime’s advances and  capabilities remains unclear. The intensification  of relations between Russia and North Korea  (with Beijing in the background) in the context of the war in Ukraine could contribute to an  upgrading of North Korea’s ballistic and nuclear  program.

Can it be said that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—a  country that had definitively relinquished the  nuclear weapons stationed on its territory in 1996— has in its own way contributed to the acceleration  of nuclear proliferation worldwide? Or at least to  the consideration that only nuclear weapons  provide a sufficiently deterrent means to avoid  aggression by a third country? Moreover, we have  seen that in exchange for Pyongyang’s military  support in this conflict with Ukraine, Moscow  ended its, admittedly limited, cooperation with the  United States aimed at curbing North Korean  ambitions, even going so far as to use its veto at  the United Nations Security Council to block UN  monitoring of the implementation of sanctions  imposed by the international community against  North Korea in relation to the development of its  military nuclear program. What can be concluded  from this?  

One of the characteristics of the “third nuclear  age” is unconstrained competition. In a recent  article, Louis Gautier [1] recalled: “The third  nuclear age is indeed characterized by the  resumption of a frenzied arms race, strategic  competition between blocs of powers, and a  relaxation of the disciplines of prudence that  had until then been deeply internalized by  nuclear states…

In the third nuclear age, there are no longer any  leaders, nor any directorate.” This new race and  competition corresponds to a generalized  disinhibition and to nuclear blackmail or  intimidation. Finally, with regard to the war in  Ukraine, nuclear blackmail is combined with a  form of theater sanctuarization, an “aggressive  sanctuarization” in which the weapon is used for  purposes of conquest and coercion.

This could constitute a precedent, notably in the  strategic framework of Taiwan. In light of Sino Russian cooperation, exchanges, and feedback  on the war in Ukraine, Beijing could draw  inspiration from Russia in this logic of  “aggressive sanctuarization.”

Thus, with regard to nuclear Asia and the  strategic relations between China, Russia, and  North Korea, it is not only a question of the  quantitative and qualitative rise in weapons, but  also of increased, multidirectional pressure from  “aggressive” deterrence across several  simultaneous theaters.

Among the United States’ allies threatened by a  regional conflict are, in Asia in particular, Japan,  Taiwan and South Korea. The latter, like others in  Europe, may have been led to question the  credibility of the American “nuclear umbrella”  following certain impromptu statements by  President Trump. If one or more of these countries,  particularly in East Asia, were to decide—as some  of their leaders have already contemplated—to  build their own nuclear weapons in order to guard  against any external threat, could this, in your  view, create a domino effect in the region and  consequently sound the death knell of the nuclear  non-proliferation regime?  

In July 2024, the United States and South Korea adopted a joint directive aimed at strengthening their cooperation on nuclear  deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Emerging  from the work of the Nuclear Consultative Group  established in 2023, this directive notably seeks  to better integrate South Korean conventional  forces into potential U.S. nuclear operations.

It forms part of a series of U.S. reassurance  measures, such as the symbolic port call of a  U.S. nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine  (USS Kentucky – SSBN 737) in Busan in 2023. This  constitutes a form of strategic signaling. A  comparable dynamic exists with Japan, albeit  more discreetly, with the aim of consolidating  U.S. extended deterrence in the face of growing  threats from China and North Korea, in a context  of increasing doubts regarding the credibility of  that deterrence.

Since the early 2010s, the debate on U.S.  extended deterrence in Northeast Asia has  intensified, in the wake of the “pivot to Asia”  launched by the Obama administration and  subsequently the Indo-Pacific strategy. This  strategic reorientation aimed to respond to the  growing threats posed by North Korea and  China to U.S. allies, particularly Japan and South  Korea.

The acceleration of North Korea’s ballistic  and nuclear programs, as well as the  modernization of Chinese forces, has  reinforced the perception of a more  unstable security environment. The  military trajectory of China and North  Korea is shaping the defense tools of both  South Korea and Japan.

In response to these developments, Washington  has deepened its mechanisms for consultation  and coordination with its allies. In South Korea,  frameworks such as the Tailored Deterrence  Strategy (TDS) have been developed and  revised in order to adapt deterrence to North  Korean threats. In Japan, the Extended  Deterrence Dialogue has become one of the  most sophisticated instruments of bilateral  cooperation in the field of deterrence.

However, despite this institutional strengthening,  the credibility of U.S. guarantees remains  contested. In both South Korea and Japan,  debates are emerging over the reliability of the  American commitment, fueling calls for the  reintroduction of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons  or even for the acquisition of national nuclear  capabilities, particularly in South Korea.

These trends reveal a persistent fragility in  extended deterrence, aggravated by the  perception that the United States might seek to  avoid nuclear escalation by constraining its  allies during major crises.

A parallel is drawn with the adaptation of NATO  deterrence in Europe, initiated in 2010 and  accelerated after 2014. In both regions, the need  for greater burden-sharing and increased  investment by allies is now acknowledged,  although national capabilities and political will  vary.

Finally, reflection on extended deterrence in  Northeast Asia has been shaped by European  conflicts, notably the war in Ukraine. A growing  consensus underscores the interdependence of  the European and Asian theaters, even if  perceptions of threat diverge. The main risk  identified is not so much a breakdown of the  nuclear balance as nuclear escalation resulting  from conventional conflicts, which has become  a central factor of strategic instability in both  regions.

While historically strongly committed to non proliferation, Japan and South Korea are now at  the center of major reflection on horizontal  proliferation. Our era is clearly marked by a  recomposition of the global nuclear order. In the  same article, Louis Gautier recalled: “Japan,  which refused to sign the TPNW (Treaty on the  Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons) ‘so as not to  insult the future,’ is striving at all costs to  revitalize the American nuclear guarantee. But  its efforts are marked by considerable  nervousness. The same is true of the less  controlled calls by certain South Korean leaders  in favor of a national path to nuclear  capabilities.” [2]

Can it therefore be considered that the risks of  nuclear proliferation are higher in Asia than in  Europe, given that the latter continent may feel better protected from external threats thanks to  the French and British nuclear arsenals capable of  providing extended deterrence within NATO?  

Undeniably, Asia is today the center of  gravity of this “new nuclear age” by virtue  of the number of states concerned and the  weapons developed.

While historically strongly attached to non proliferation, Japan and South Korea are at the  heart of major reflections on horizontal  proliferation. Our era is clearly marked by a  recomposition of the global nuclear order.

In the same article, Louis Gautier recalled:  “Japan, which refused to sign the TPNW ‘so as  not to insult the future,’ is striving at all costs to  revitalize the American nuclear guarantee. But  its efforts are marked by considerable  nervousness. The same is true of the less  controlled calls by certain South Korean leaders  in favor of a national path to nuclear  capabilities.” [3]

If military nuclear power is morally disqualified in  the Japanese public sphere, associated with  suffering and destruction, and giving rise to the  doctrine of the three non-nuclear principles (not  possessing, not producing, not introducing  nuclear weapons), the strategic-military  alliance with the United States underscores how  structuring and political the issue of the  “American umbrella” remains within restricted  circles.

This is an issue of particular sensitivity in Japan,  different from Korea, where deterrence is  increasingly present in public debate without,  however, leading to any significant change.

This is all the more so since a poll conducted in  February 2022 indicated that 71% of the South Korean  population were in favor of their country acquiring  nuclear weapons. Another poll conducted in May of  the same year revealed that 70.2% of respondents  supported the country’s nuclearization, and that  63.6% favored it even if such a decision could result in  violating the NPT. The results of these polls appeared  to respond to North Korea’s development of  weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to China’s  growing assertiveness as perceived in its regional  environment. These factors have had the same  impact on the Japanese debate over nuclearization,  notably following statements by former Prime  Minister Shinzo Abe, who publicly declared during his  lifetime that Japan should seriously and urgently  reflect on the issue of nuclear weapons, thus marking  a fundamental break with the pacifist commitment adopted by Japan after the Pacific War. What is your  view?  

Regional competition in Asia and international  competition, combined with China’s aggressive  postures and “arsenalization,” as well as North  Korean uncertainties, are generating a strong  movement within South Korean and Japanese  public opinion and, of course, within political  landscapes. In other words, the militarization of  Asia is fostering an evolution in mindsets and  perceptions within the societies of Northeast  Asian democracies. This is a fundamental issue  for the next generation.

While these societies are undergoing  accelerated and structural aging, yet remain  major industrial and innovative countries, they  are reflecting on proliferation within the  structuring framework of alliances with the  American power. National security and foreign  policy elements (in their neighborhood)  permeate domestic politics. In January 2023,  South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, criticized  in Korea, called for a Korean path to deterrence.

More generally, the recomposition of security  architectures in the Indo-Pacific or Asia-Pacific,  combined with militarization, is energizing this  third nuclear age. In this regard, one may cite  the various nuclear-powered submarine  programs that Australia is expected to acquire  under AUKUS or that South Korea is pursuing.  This reflects the strategic-military framing of  China’s rise and of its network of nuclear  partners. In January 2026, South Korean  President Lee Jae-myung stated that North  Korea would produce enough nuclear material  each year to assemble up to 20 atomic  weapons, “warning of a ‘global danger’ if  nothing is done to resolve the issue.”

More recently, the North Korean regime, at the  Party Congress, stated that it was “clarifying  plans for the next stage aimed at strengthening  the country’s nuclear deterrent force.” Indeed,  the continuation of North Korea’s nuclear and  ballistic program structures South Korea’s  security architecture. Unlike in Japan, deterrence  fuels broader debates within Korean public  opinion and restricted circles alike. Political  cleavages are clear, and the debates remain  legitimate.

The trauma of the two bombs in Japan remains  fundamental, both within Japanese society  (notably among the survivors—the hibakusha),  in public opinion, and in the political landscape.  The discreet debates on nuclear matters in  Japan reflect an evolution/aggravation of the archipelago’s strategic and security  environment, in which China’s militarization,  North Korean proliferation, and Russian postures  (blackmail, threats, and theater sanctuarization/Ukraine) form the pillars of the defense  apparatus.

Deterrence does not prevent crises and war, but  the ultima ratio makes it possible to contain  escalation, prevent runaway dynamics, and  rationalize escalation between two nuclear  powers. While the “third nuclear age” is  particularly at work in Asia, and more generally in  the world, doctrinal evolutions in the context of  competition and regional tensions will shape  strategic balances over the next ten years as a  lever of political influence and power.

On 4 February 2026, Russia declared that it no  longer considered itself bound by the New START  Treaty limiting the number of strategic nuclear  launchers and deployed nuclear warheads on those  launchers, while also establishing a new  verification system for compliance with the  Treaty’s provisions. Can it be said that the Russian  decision, without directly threatening Asia,  degrades the global deterrence ecosystem,  thereby making Asia—already fragile—more  unstable, more unpredictable and potentially more  nuclear?  

Signed in 2010 and entering into force in 2011, the  New START Treaty (New Strategic Arms  Reduction Treaty) had been extended once in  2021 for five years, setting its expiration date at 5  February 2026. With the expiration of New START

—the last bilateral nuclear arms-control  agreeement between the United States and  Russia, which entered into force in 2011—the legal  constraint limiting their strategic arsenals  disappears. This poses a major challenge for  international security, as there is currently  neither an extension nor a clear successor to  this treaty. The two nuclear powers are  nevertheless discussing a resumption of  strategic dialogue in order to avoid an arms  race and maintain a minimum level of  transparency, but negotiations are fragile and  difficult.

The situation is made more complex by:

The absence of verification mechanisms for  several years,

Divergences over the modalities of a future  agreement,

The emergence of other nuclear powers  (such as China) outside the traditional  bilateral framework.

For several years, other agreements have  disappeared (such as the INF Treaty on  intermediate-range nuclear forces in 2019). With  the end of New START, there is no longer any  major bilateral treaty limiting strategic nuclear  weapons between Washington and Moscow—an unprecedented situation since the 1970s. This  means that strategic dialogue becomes more  difficult, Europe finds itself more exposed to  nuclear tensions, and the credibility of the global  non-proliferation regime weakens. The logic of  deterrence becomes more “competitive” again.

This may also push other nuclear powers  (notably China) to accelerate their own  programs. Transparency disappears, leading to  increased mistrust, risks of misinterpretation,  and strategic tensions. In this respect, it should  be recalled that at the heart of strategic rivalry  and competition between the United States and  China, the United States recently claimed that  Beijing may have conducted at least one secret  nuclear test in 2020.

In April 2020, the U.S. Department of State  published its annual report to Congress on  compliance with arms-control agreements. It  noted intense activity at the Lop Nor nuclear test  site (Xinjiang province) and mentioned the  possibility that China may have conducted or  prepared low-yield nuclear tests, raising  questions about compliance with international  norms. Beijing firmly denied this, describing the  report as “false accusations” and denouncing  their politicization. China’s last nuclear test dates  back to the summer of 1996. Beijing is reported  to have conducted 45 nuclear tests between  1964 and 1996.

Neither the United States nor China has ratified  the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty  (CTBT), which is therefore not in force for them.  Moreover, the notion of “low yield” or “zero-yield”  is not defined in the CTBT, which complicates  the interpretation of observations of activity at  the site. Some experts suggest that the signals  could simply result from subcritical tests  (without a chain reaction), which are permitted  under the CTBT.

China has intensified its nuclear weapons  simulation activities, notably under the  mountains of Mianyang (Sichuan province), in  order to improve the precision and  sophistication of its arsenal, which fuels  questions about its intentions.

Does Russia’s unwillingness to extend the New  START Treaty in its current form (bilateral: USA vs.  Russia) not indirectly reflect the fact that nuclear  proliferation and arms control no longer concern  only the United States and Russia, but also other countries, such as China, which is seeking to  achieve parity with the United States? Could the  non-renewal of the New START Treaty be both  worrying in terms of reigniting the nuclear arms  (and testing) race and realistic in light of this new  situation, meaning that, theoretically, China (and  even other Asian countries, North Korea in  particular) should normally be included in the  perspective of a hypothetical New START II  Treaty? What is your view? Would China be ready  to participate in negotiations for a new New START  Treaty that would include it?  

The obsolescence of the bilateral format is  indeed a fait accompli. Russia justifies its refusal  to extend the treaty “as it stands” with two  arguments of strategic “realism.”

First, the emergence of China: Moscow and  Washington agree (for once) that the rapid  expansion of China’s arsenal changes the  equation. Beijing would be aiming, in the long  term, at technical and political parity with the  two major post–Cold War nuclear powers.

Second, the inclusion of NATO. Any future treaty  would now have to include the arsenals of  France and the United Kingdom. According to  Moscow, it is illogical to limit Russian weapons  while ignoring the nuclear capabilities of the  United States’ European allies.

Is China ready to negotiate?  

For the time being, Beijing’s answer is a  categorical “no,” and this for several reasons:  The asymmetry of stockpiles: Even though it is  growing rapidly, China considers that its arsenal  (estimated at around 700–800 warheads in  2026) remains well below the approximately  1,550 deployed warheads (and the thousands in  reserve) of the United States and Russia. For  Beijing, it is up to the two giants to drastically  reduce their stockpiles before it sits down at the  table.

The doctrine of “Minimum Deterrence”: China  refuses to disclose its exact numbers, arguing  that secrecy is the key to its survival in the face  of more powerful adversaries. Accepting a New  START II-type treaty would imply intrusive on-site  inspections, which Beijing considers a threat to  its national security.

Finally, the “no first use” position. China  frequently invokes its commitment never to use  nuclear weapons first in order to argue that it is  not an “offensive” threat, unlike American and  Russian doctrines. It is important to stress that  the end of New START without a replacement  creates a total legal vacuum, and this at several  levels: Qualitative arms race. Without numerical  limits, the focus shifts to disruptive technologies  (hypersonic missiles, nuclear-powered  underwater drones, AI integrated into command  systems). Resumption of testing. Recent  statements by the three major powers suggest  a temptation to resume actual nuclear testing  to validate these new technologies, which would  definitively bury the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Finally, instability in Asia. North Korea, as you  noted, observes this deterioration of  international norms as a “green light” to pursue  its own program, while Japan and South Korea,  as previously mentioned, are experiencing  debates at various levels regarding deterrence.  In addition, the combined arsenals of Pakistan  and India further alter the strategic equation.

Recurring exchanges between Russia, China  and Iran on nuclear issues (notably in 2025)  within a diplomatic framework reflect a renewed  web of strategic porosity. Although North Korea  does not formally participate in these  diplomatic forums, the continuation of its  nuclear program and its rapprochement with  Russia confirm nuclear multipolarity. It remains  the case that, in the missile domain, exchanges  with North Korea are known and documented.

Nuclear multipolarity is increasingly structuring,  making our time the new nuclear age.

[1] https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2025/12/15/le-nouvel age-nucleaire/

[2] https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2025/12/15/le-nouvel age-nucleaire/

[3] https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2025/12/15/le-nouvel age-nucleaire/

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