The editorial of March 2026

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has  dispelled any ambiguity.

A state can invade another sovereign state,  annex territory, bombard cities and civilian  populations, without the international  system proving capable of preventing it.

Condemnations may rain down and sanctions  accumulate, yet the violated border remains so.  This precedent carries profound significance for  Asia. It demonstrates that sovereignty is  protected neither by international law nor by the  principles that underpin it, but by the balance of  power. China, moreover, has not been mistaken  in reading this reality. Beijing has never  genuinely defended Ukrainian sovereignty [3].

The Chinese capital did not formally condemn  the invasion, nor did it speak of aggression,  contenting itself with echoing the Russian  narrative.

This caution is not neutrality but cold calculation: a  determination not to weaken a strategic partner  while observing the reactions of a common  adversary—the United States. The lesson is simple:  it is not the violation of sovereignty that poses a  problem, but who commits it.

Accordingly, China’s call for “unification” (tongyi)  with Taiwan cannot be understood in isolation. It  forms part of a broader vision in which  sovereignty becomes the right of powerful  states to impose their reading of history. Taiwan  is not perceived as a political entity, but as a  territory to be reclaimed—less out of nationalist  sentiment than for strategic reasons. Taiwan’s  democracy, the will of its population, and its de  facto independence are relegated to secondary  considerations in the face of imperatives of  power [4].

Yet reducing the question of sovereignty in Asia  to Taiwan would be a mistake. The Asian  continent is a veritable minefield of sovereignty  disputes. In the South China Sea (the “nine-dash  line”) and the East China Sea (the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands), several states see their  Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) challenged by  a power that transforms reclaimed reefs into  military bases.

In the Himalayan region, India and China confront  one another through armed demonstrations. The  same holds true between Thailand and  Cambodia. On the Korean peninsula, two states  continue to claim exclusive legitimacy over a  single nation. In Kashmir, sovereignty has been a  bloody fault line between India and Pakistan for  nearly eighty years.

In this context, Western discourse on the defense  of sovereignty also appears weakened. The  abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás  Maduro by the United States produced a  devastating effect. Whatever judgment one may  pass on the Venezuelan regime, the removal of a  head of state—however illegitimate—from his  territory by a foreign power constitutes a major  breach of international norms [5]. For Asian states, the message is unequivocal: sovereignty  is respected only so long as it does not obstruct.

Donald Trump’s remarks about acquiring  Greenland, under the guise of strategic security  [6], completed this shift. Behind the provocation  lies a blunt logic: territories are no longer  inhabited political spaces but geostrategic  pawns. This vision finds a troubling echo in Asia,  where certain states fear that their sovereignty  might one day be deemed negotiable,  purchasable, or circumventable. Faced with this  accumulation of precedents, Asia can draw only  a bitter conclusion: sovereignty is not a right but  a privilege reserved for those able to defend it  militarily, economically, or diplomatically. Others  must adapt, align, or remain silent.

The danger is immense. A world in which  sovereignty becomes relative is one in which  force replaces law, history is rewritten by the  victors, and grey zones multiply until they  explode.

Asia—with its colonial legacies, disputed  borders, and rival powers—is undoubtedly  the region with the most to lose in such a  drift.

By invoking sovereignty when it suits them and  ignoring it when it constrains them, the great  powers undermine the only principle capable of  limiting their own violence. And when no one  believes in sovereignty any longer, only one rule  remains: that of the strongest.

Three trajectories now emerge for Asia.

The first is that of generalized armed deterrence.  In the face of the weakening of law, states—such  as China, Japan, or India—are strengthening  their military capabilities, multiplying  partnerships and alliances, accepting the  premise that only force guarantees sovereignty.  This logic heightens the risks of escalation,  notably around Taiwan, in the South and East  China Seas, along the Sino-Indian and Indo Pakistani borders, and on the Korean peninsula.

The second trajectory is that of fragmented  sovereignty, in which certain states retain formal  autonomy but endure growing strategic,  economic, or technological dependence. In this  scenario, sovereignty persists juridically but  dissolves within asymmetric interdependence  and pressures exerted by major powers. This is  the case, in particular, for most of the former  tributary states of China in Southeast Asia. Yet they continue to rely on the American umbrella  for protection.

The third path—more fragile yet more ambitious —would entail a collective reaffirmation of  international law by Asian states themselves.  This would require breaking with tacit  acceptance of faits accomplis, strengthening  regional dispute-settlement mechanisms  (ASEAN [7], ARF [8], SAARC [9], SCO [10], RCEP [11],  CPTPP [12]), and restoring binding force to the  principles of the United Nations Charter. Nothing  today suggests that this course will prevail.

Asia thus stands at a pivotal moment. If  sovereignty continues to be treated as a  strategic adjustment variable, the continent  could become the epicenter of the major crises  of the twenty-first century. If, on the contrary,  Asia succeeds in reasserting the primacy of law  over force, it could play a decisive role in  refounding an international order now  profoundly weakened.

[1] Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter: “The  Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign  equality of all its Members.”

[2] Ibid., Article 2(4): “All Members shall refrain in their  international relations from the threat or use of force against  the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,  or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the  United Nations.”

[3] https://lerubicon.org/la-chine-lukraine-et-les dilemmes-dune-definition-de-la-souverainete/

[4] In contravention of Article 1(2) of the Charter, which  defines the purposes of the United Nations as including: “to  develop friendly relations among nations based on respect  for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of  peoples.”

[5] Article 2(7) of the Charter: “Nothing contained in the  present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to  intervene in matters which are essentially within the  domestic jurisdiction of any state…”

[6] In 2018, China declared itself a “near-Arctic state” with  the aim of increasing its influence in the region. Beijing also  announced its intention to build a “Polar Silk Road” as part of  its global Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), through which it has  developed economic ties with numerous countries,  including in Latin America.

[7] Association of Southeast Asian Nations, now comprising  the eleven member states of Southeast Asia (including  Timor-Leste), which constitute the regional core of the area  (principle of centrality), connecting economic, security, and  diplomatic frameworks without taking sides or forming  military blocs. The other frameworks listed below revolve  around or interact with it.

[8] ASEAN Regional Forum, a military and strategic dialogue  forum in the Asia-Pacific bringing together twenty-seven  members, including the United States, China, Russia, Japan,  South Korea, India, Australia, and the European Union.

[9] South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, a  primarily economic South Asian regional organization  comprising eight states: Afghanistan (membership de facto  suspended), Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal,  Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

[10] Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, founded in 2001 at  the initiative of China and Russia, comprising nine members  (including India, Pakistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,  Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), initially focused on border  security in Central Asia.

[11] Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, bringing  together the eleven ASEAN countries plus China, Japan,  South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, covering  approximately 30% of global GDP and constituting the  largest free-trade agreement in the world.

[12] Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans Pacific Partnership, which replaced the Trans-Pacific  Partnership (TPP) in 2018 after the withdrawal of the United  States, comprising twelve member countries, including  Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam,  Malaysia, and Brunei in Asia-Pacific; Canada, Mexico, Chile,  and Peru in the Americas; and the United Kingdom in Europe.  The CPTPP aims to set the rules of future trade and to limit  China’s normative influence.