The editorial of April 2026

Four years after the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, it must be acknowledged that the war is stalling. To date, it has neither turned into a rapid victory for Moscow (as Putin had hoped), nor been resolved through fast-paced negotiations (as Trump had boasted).

No one today can say whether the conflict will find a military or diplomatic outcome, or whether it will freeze into a lasting front line (the most likely outcome?). One thing is certain, however: this prolonged war (as well as the current one with Iran, now extending across the entire Middle East) is profoundly reshaping global balances, including on the Asian continent, which is also fully feeling its repercussions.

In 2022, the invasion launched by Moscow caused a shockwave that was both moral and strategic. In 2026, the invasion has become a structural turning point in global geopolitics. This shift has deeply influenced how Asian countries position themselves today.

Over the years, the prolongation of the conflict has confirmed to Asian capitals that it is not an isolated episode, but rather symptomatic of a reconfiguration of the international order.

For many Asian states, the priority is no longer to react to an event, but to manage a durably unstable environment. Energy, supply chains, agricultural markets, and financial flows have been reconfigured: liquefied natural gas from Qatar, Australia, and the United States; oil from the Middle East and Africa; development of strategic reserves and import infrastructures (LNG terminals, pipelines); acceleration of investments in renewable energy (solar, offshore wind, and civilian nuclear power for Japan and South Korea in particular); mitigation strategies (relocation and diversification of suppliers); payments in alternative currencies or through bilateral mechanisms with China and Russia.

Russia, under Western sanctions, has redirected an increasing share of its energy exports toward Asia (81% of total Russian crude oil exports, compared to around 41% in 2021).

This reorientation has thus created economic opportunities for certain countries. As it drags on, this war has also reinforced a central reflex in Asia, namely that of not locking oneself into bloc-based logic.

The People’s Republic of China remains the key actor in this equation. Four years after the beginning of the conflict, Beijing observes a Russia that is militarily weakened and isolated from much of the West, even if the Russian capital still retains strategic disruptive capacity.

For China, the current situation presents a double advantage: having before it a quasi-allied Russia that is more dependent and therefore more malleable, while at the same time benefiting from a lasting distraction for the United States and Europe, which can only serve its aspiration to global hegemony.

However, a Russia that becomes unstable or too weakened would not be without unpredictable consequences on China’s northern borders. This still-possible scenario forces Beijing to continue along the line it adopted from the beginning of the conflict, which is based on measured political support for its “ally of circumstance,” through strengthened economic as well as military cooperation (exports of dual-use goods), while remaining cautious to avoid Western secondary sanctions.

At the same time, the war offers China a full-scale observatory of modern conflicts, illustrated by unexpected Ukrainian resilience, made possible notably by the effectiveness of Western financial and military support and by the role of emerging technologies (AI, drones, robots, integrated networks and big data, etc.). These are lessons that go beyond the Ukrainian theater and are likely to influence its strategic choices, for example regarding Taiwan, in its ambitions of conquest.

It should be noted that Beijing has reacted very weakly to American actions against its partner countries (Venezuela, Iran), likely so as not to compromise the official visit to Beijing by President Trump announced for March 31 to April 2.

For India, the stalemate of the conflict has confirmed the relevance of its strategy of autonomy.

While New Delhi stated in 2026 that it wishes to develop and strengthen its ties with Russia, particularly in economic, energy, and diplomatic matters, some observers note that the relationship is experiencing a relative decline, becoming less exclusive than before, while repositioning itself toward other partners (so-called “multi-alignment” or balancing policy), through the deepening of strategic partnerships with Western powers in the Indo-Pacific (Pax Silica initiative securing critical technology supply chains, Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology or iCET with the United States; high-level dialogues with the European Union on green growth, digital technologies, investments, connectivity, and security; consolidation of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Australia, QUAD or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the United States, Japan, and Australia, etc.).

Added to this are the India-European Union free trade agreement (FTA), the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the United Kingdom, the “provisional” India-United States trade deal, and many others.

These four years of war have shown that no international pressure has truly forced India to change its line. On the contrary, the fragmentation of the international system has strengthened its room for maneuver, making India appear today as one of the indirect beneficiaries of a world less structured by a single hegemony.

India, fearing being deprived of Middle Eastern oil due to the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, has begun to take in Russian oil cargoes, benefiting from a temporary waiver from the Trump administration.

Japan and South Korea, which had quickly condemned the Russian invasion and adopted sanctions against Moscow, maintain their alignment with Western powers, of which they are fully part.

However, the prolongation of the conflict, and its still possible extension, is fostering in both countries a broader reflection: preparing for a world in which high-intensity conflicts are no longer unthinkable. This was confirmed by the election of the Japanese Prime Minister and her statements committing her country alongside the island of Taiwan in the event it were to be attacked by its large neighbor.

The debate on increasing defense budgets, on deterrence capabilities (nuclear weapons), and on the integration of alliances (Japan/South Korea/Philippines/United States) has intensified. The war in Ukraine, having become a war of attrition, acts as a strategic warning. This conflict reminds everyone that stability is never permanently guaranteed, with the war involving Iran and its extension across the Middle East providing further proof.

In Southeast Asia, the prolonged war has continued to fuel tensions in energy and food markets. For the now 11 ASEAN countries (+ Timor-Leste), the priority objective remains economic stability and diplomatic neutrality.

The conflict reinforces their determination to avoid excessive dependence on any major power.

Diversification of partners, multiplication of trade agreements, caution in political statements—Southeast Asia seeks to pursue a methodical balancing diplomacy in line with the “pragmatism practice theory” to which it adheres, and based on concepts such as the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN).

Four years on, the war in Ukraine acts as a revealer of a world that has entered an era of structural instability. Faced with this reality, Asia seems to move forward with the conviction that, in an uncertain international system, survival and influence belong to those who know how to preserve their options.

And perhaps it is there, even more than on the European battlefields, that a decisive part of the 21st century is being played.