Japan: the end of Pacifism?

Known for the absolute pacifism it has jealously guarded since the end of the war 81 years ago, Japan has just caused widespread astonishment by lifting, in April 2026, the self-imposed ban on exports of lethal weapons that had been in force since 1967.

The move, which came after the decision to bring forward by one year the timetable for doubling the defence budget from 1% to 2% of GDP, has been described as a “break with pacifism” (New York Times), an “abandonment of pacifism” (Nikkei Asia), a “historic rearmament” (Asia Times), and even a “dangerous remilitarisation” (Chinese government) of the country.

Geopolitical Context

The United States’ retreat into itself since Donald Trump’s return to power and the resulting geopolitical instability are pushing America’s allies to each seek their own path to survival in a world where the US security guarantee can no longer be taken for granted.

As part of this readjustment, middle powers are tending to close ranks with one another, while some appear to be turning increasingly towards the other superpower, China.

In Asia, growing signs of a US strategic retreat are leading Southeast Asian countries to reconsider the subtle neutrality they have so far sought to maintain between the two superpowers, and to lean increasingly towards Beijing.

A survey conducted this year by Singapore’s ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute shows that 52% of these countries would opt for China (compared with 48% for the US) if forced to choose between Washington and Beijing. This marks a clear reversal from the 2025 results, when 52% still preferred the US to China (47%).

In Northeast Asia, the geopolitical climate is already highly tense. Three democratic US allies (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) face three belligerent nuclear-armed authoritarian powers (China, North Korea and Russia). The perceptible decline in US influence is forcing these allies to readjust, without calling into question their alliance with Washington.

South Korea, for example, is undertaking a new economic opening towards China while strengthening its own defence capabilities, including plans to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. Donald Trump’s unpredictability has also led to a warming of relations between Seoul and Tokyo, long-standing rivals divided by lingering resentment over Japanese colonisation. Since 2005, Seoul has also been one of NATO’s four Indo-Pacific partners (IP4 = South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand).

Japan: Farewell to Pacifism?

Within this broader strategic realignment of middle powers caught between the two superpowers, Japan is an exception insofar as it rules out, at least for the time being, the option of rapprochement with China. Bilateral relations with Beijing are at their lowest point since a head of government considered excessively belligerent and nationalist by Beijing came to power in Tokyo.

Tokyo’s response to the growing instability of its geostrategic environment is therefore to embark on a new stage of rearmament, in defiance of the strict pacifism prescribed by its Constitution since 1946.

This approach enables Japan both to satisfy its US ally’s demand for greater security autonomy and to fill the foreseeable strategic vacuum. As part of what Beijing condemns as dangerous remilitarisation, Tokyo reopened exports of lethal weapons in April 2026, having banned them since 1967.

Freed from this constraint, Japan is using arms sales and security partnerships to develop a network of regional quasi-alliances (Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, etc.) which, according to Nikkei Asia, appears to reflect a desire to secure the Indo-Pacific region, through which its vital natural-resource supply routes pass. According to the New York Times, “Japan is now projecting itself as a new force for stability and power in a region shaken by China’s aggressive posture and the political volatility of Donald Trump’s America.”

According to Huong Le Thu, Asia director at the International Crisis Group, quoted by the US newspaper, “the new Japan now represents the stability and continuity that the region previously expected from the US, preparing to fill the leadership vacuum and now offering its ‘hard power’ in addition to its ‘soft power’.”

As we shall see below, Japan, now less constrained by its traditional pacifism, is also developing security partnerships with European countries. The volatility of the Trump era is not the sole motivation behind Japan’s chosen course.

Indeed, this course responds first and foremost to the nationalist agenda championed by Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae. A member of the far-right wing of the ruling LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), the new head of government has long been known for her desire to break with the pacifist Constitution in order to fulfil her ambition of normalising the country’s military status. From the perspective of the right, such military normalisation would allow Japan to defend itself without the constraints of a pacifism considered utopian.

Pacifism: A History

Following its surrender in 1945, the country, then deeply repentant over its militarist past, was compelled to accept the pacifist and democratic Constitution imposed on it by the American occupier in 1946. Under Article 9 of this Constitution [1], Japan forever renounces war and prohibits itself from maintaining land, sea and air forces.

However, the Korean War in 1950 and the urgent need for allies to contain the advance of communism in Asia soon led Washington to tolerate the creation in Japan, in 1950, of a “Police Reserve”, which was upgraded in 1954 into the “Self-Defense Forces” (SDF), based on the interpretation that “self-defence” is not explicitly prohibited by the Constitution. With the help of economic growth, Japan’s SDF, even with a budget limited to 1% of GDP, eventually developed into one of the most powerful and modern armed forces (or rather, self-defence forces!) in Asia today.

Despite constant hostility from conservatives, who regard it as dangerously utopian, Article 9 has always enjoyed strong support from a pacifist and antimilitarist population. The pacifism it advocates facilitated the reconstruction of a country devastated by war.

Instead of spending a substantial budget on defence, post-war Japan, protected by the US nuclear umbrella, was able to concentrate all its national resources on rebuilding the country, becoming the world’s second-largest economy in the 1980s.

More than that, Article 9 is valued above all for having guaranteed Japan lasting peace since the end of the war. Tokyo has always been able to invoke Article 9 in response to Washington’s repeated pressure for Japan to make a military contribution to “American wars” (Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, etc.). For its defenders, Article 9 thus constitutes a formidable shield protecting the country from upheavals elsewhere in the world.

In addition to its pacifist Constitution, Japan sought to reinforce its pacifism by imposing on itself, in 1967, the “Three Principles on Arms Exports”, under which the archipelago prohibited arms exports to (1) communist countries, (2) countries subject to UN sanctions and (3) countries involved in armed conflict.

Under pressure, notably from the United States, this self-imposed restriction on arms exports was successively relaxed before being replaced in 2014 by the “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment” (the word “arms” was no longer used…). Subject to strict conditions regarding recipients, these principles paved the way for exports of five categories of “non-lethal” equipment (rescue, transport, vigilance, surveillance and mine clearance). Japan was thus able to supply bulletproof vests to Ukraine, as well as radars and “unarmed”, and therefore non-lethal, maritime patrol vessels to the Philippines.

In addition to its self-imposed restriction on arms exports, the only country to have suffered atomic bombings adopted, by parliamentary resolution in 1967, the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”, consisting of (1) not possessing, (2) not producing and (3) not introducing nuclear weapons into national territory.

The third principle, however, is controversial, as it is evident that US forces stationed in Japan possess nuclear weapons. How, then, can nuclear weapons be banned from national territory while living under the protection of the US nuclear umbrella? This is one of the contradictions that the current government intends to resolve in the coming months.

A Long Process of Gradual “Rearmament”

However much the world may be surprised by Japan’s “historic turning point and abandonment of pacifism” (New York Times) following its decision to authorise exports of lethal weapons, it must be acknowledged that this is not the first time the country has “rearmed”.

In fact, efforts to relax the political, legal and constitutional constraints limiting post-war Japan’s defence began immediately after the promulgation of the pacifist Constitution in 1946.

In contrast to a population firmly committed to the lasting peace guaranteed by the pacifist Constitution, there has always been a current of opposition to this pacifism, regarded as dangerously utopian in the country’s hostile geostrategic environment. This opposition comes mainly from the right, including the ruling LDP.

Within this party, whose founding principle is precisely constitutional revision, some wish to make Japan a militarily “normal” country capable of fulfilling its strategic commitments, while others dream of a return to the good old days when the country was respected as a militarist imperial power. Still others challenge the foreign (American) origins of the Constitution and, regardless of pacifism, call for a new and genuinely sovereign fundamental law.

Over the eight decades since the Constitution was adopted, successive Japanese leaders, almost exclusively from the LDP, have all expressed, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, their desire for constitutional amendment [2]. Unable to meet the conditions required for amendment, they have so far resorted to “reinterpretations” of the Constitution to carry out a succession of rearmament measures.

To begin with, the creation in 1954 of the Japanese “Self-Defense Forces” (SDF) and the National Defense Agency (upgraded to a ministry in 2007) already constituted the first in this series of rearmament measures. Since then, the ruling right and pressure from Washington have pushed Tokyo to undertake successive further steps in rearmament, each time testing the limits of the pacifism prescribed by the Constitution.

Thus, while a Japan-US security treaty signed in 1960 reinforced the country’s dependence on its American ally, Japan, which had rejoined the United Nations in 1956, adopted a law in 1991, the year of the first Gulf War, allowing the SDF to participate in UN peacekeeping operations.

Although the legislation imposed strict conditions regarding neutrality, the use of weapons and intervention limited to non-conflict zones, and although such operations took place under the UN flag, this first deployment of Japanese military personnel beyond the country’s borders caused considerable concern at the time, both domestically and among Japan’s neighbours, foremost among them China, where memories of the brutal atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese Army on their soil remained vivid. Nevertheless, in 1992, Japanese peacekeepers participated in the reconstruction of Cambodia.

In 1999, a new Japan-US security agreement paved the way for logistical support by the SDF to US forces in the event of conflict. The SDF consequently refuelled US ships in the Indian Ocean during the war in Afghanistan following the attacks of 11 September 2001. This represented a new stage of remilitarisation that was viewed very negatively by neighbouring countries, since the SDF were no longer wearing UN blue helmets for this extraterritorial mission. In 2003, yielding to US pressure and again without UN cover, the SDF took part in humanitarian and infrastructure reconstruction missions in non-conflict areas of Iraq.

Thus, having originally started from a principle of “exclusively defence-oriented self-defence” confined to the national territory, Japan’s SDF “rearmed” over the course of half a century to the point where they became free to operate beyond national borders without UN cover and without any amendment to the text of the Constitution.

Shinzo Abe’s return to power in 2012 marked a further step in Japan’s gradual remilitarisation. Still unable to amend the Constitution, the nationalist Prime Minister, who remained in power until 2020 and was assassinated in 2022, succeeded, through a “Cabinet decision”, in decreeing another major reinterpretation of Article 9.

Tokyo thereby granted itself the right to “collective” self-defence, meaning that the SDF could intervene militarily to defend allies even when Japan’s own security was not directly threatened. For critics, including liberal newspapers such as the Asahi Shimbun, the concept of “self-defence” tolerated by the Constitution was thereby being trampled underfoot.

In 2009, the commissioning of the “destroyer” Hiyuga (13,500 tonnes) raised the question of whether the SDF had shifted from the principle of “defensive self-defence” to that of “offensive self-defence”.

Although officially classified as a “destroyer”, the flat-deck vessel nevertheless looked every inch an aircraft carrier… Initially presented as a harmless helicopter carrier, the “destroyer” was refitted a year later to carry vertical-take-off F-35 fighter-bombers.

The question of whether the principle of defensive self-defence was being exceeded arose again in 2022 when, under Prime Minister Kishida, Tokyo adopted the “Three National Security Documents”. Among other things, these provided for equipping the SDF with long-range missiles for counter-attacks on enemy territory and with the capability to strike enemy bases pre-emptively, even before an attack against Japan had taken place.

Once again, critics, including the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, regarded this as a direct violation of the Constitution’s principle of “defensive self-defence” because, in theory, it opens up the possibility of unprovoked aggression against an adversary.

In April 2026, while participating in the “Balikatan” exercises in the Philippines alongside French, US and Australian forces, the Japanese contingent of 1,400 troops attracted considerable attention by firing missiles for the first time “outside national territory”. Should this action be described as yet another step in Japan’s series of remilitarisations?

In July this year, the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile by a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine in the Pacific reignited debate over a possible revision of the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” and strengthened the temptation to equip Japan’s SDF with nuclear-powered submarines. For the time being, the debate necessarily remains hypothetical, given the still deeply rooted anti-nuclear sentiment in the only country to have suffered atomic bombings.

Finally, the planned revision of the “Three National Security Documents” at the end of 2026 is expected to provide a further boost to Japan’s defence capabilities, with an emphasis on promoting the defence industry, counter-strike capabilities on enemy territory and a possible revision of the principle prohibiting the introduction of nuclear weapons.

Thus, through special legislation and bold reinterpretations of the Constitution, Tokyo has succeeded over the past eight decades in carrying out a series of successive rearmament measures despite resistance from a firmly pacifist public.

That said, no Japanese leader has yet succeeded in overcoming the population’s firm attachment to Article 9 sufficiently to put the country on the path towards genuine constitutional revision.

Towards “Proactive Pacifism”

Recently, growing awareness of threats in Japan’s immediate neighbourhood appears to have led the Japanese to soften their deep attachment to constitutional pacifism, to the point that a slight majority now tolerates a limited revision of the Constitution. This shift in attitude has led Asia Times to describe the Japanese as “reluctant realists”, if not “pragmatic realists”.

This “Yes, but…” attitude is confirmed by a survey conducted last February by the University of Tsukuba. According to the survey, 49.3% of the population now accepts a constitutional amendment. However, the Prime Minister’s plan to double military spending receives barely 38% support, while only 32% approve of the proposal to abolish the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”. It is also worth noting that 67% of respondents to an April survey by the Asahi newspaper said they opposed the liberalisation of lethal arms exports decided that same month.

Another survey conducted in April 2026 by the Yomiuri newspaper indicates that even this slight majority in favour of constitutional amendment appears to have eroded somewhat since the arrival in power of a Prime Minister known for her particularly belligerent nationalism. According to the survey, support for constitutional revision, although still a majority, fell from 60% in 2025 to 57% this year, while opposition rose from 36% to 40%.

The same survey also shows that, irrespective of the majority in favour of constitutional revision, the public remains unequivocal in its support for Article 9, with 80% opposed to any amendment of paragraph 1 (the permanent renunciation of war). As for paragraph 2 (the prohibition on maintaining armed forces), the public appears more ambivalent, with 48% in favour of retaining it and 47% in favour of amending it.

Moreover, a majority of 60% supports retaining paragraph 2 while accepting the addition of a clause constitutionally legitimising the SDF. This view reflects a widely shared desire to remedy the contradiction between the constitutional prohibition on armed forces and the now unavoidable existence of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.

This evolution in public opinion, from an absolute defence of constitutional pacifism towards hesitant tolerance of limited constitutional revision, coincides with the arrival in power last November of Takaichi Sanae, the most aggressively nationalist of Japan’s successive post-war leaders, who has never concealed her hostility towards Article 9 or her ambition to amend the Constitution.

With an exceptionally high approval rating of around 65% in February this year, together with a historic majority of more than two-thirds in the Lower House following the snap general election last April, the Prime Minister appears confident that the opportunity is greater than ever to achieve what none of her predecessors managed to accomplish: formally launch the process of constitutional revision.

Thus, while bringing forward by one year the doubling of the military budget and ending the ban on exports of lethal weapons, Ms Takaichi has relaunched the work of the parliamentary commission on constitutional amendment, with the aim of holding a vote and referendum during 2027.

At the same time, Tokyo concluded a major contract last May for the sale of eleven modern frigates (very much “lethal” this time!) to Australia. Far more than a simple arms sale, this first major Japanese arms contract is helping, according to Nikkei Asia, to cement bilateral relations within the framework of a quasi-alliance in response to China’s advance in the Pacific.

In the same vein, plans are being considered to sell the same frigates to New Zealand and to supply “second-hand” Japanese warships to the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. With Manila in particular, Tokyo is strengthening military cooperation, including intelligence sharing and the provision of defence equipment, in an effort to enhance the country’s ability to defend itself against China’s coercive advance in the South China Sea.

With India, Ms Takaichi’s visit to New Delhi in July helped cement plans for security, industrial and economic cooperation. Tokyo is particularly keen to keep New Delhi within the camp of democratic Indo-Pacific allies amid Washington’s apparent loss of interest in the QUAD, the four-way US-Australia-India-Japan alliance strongly supported by Tokyo.

It goes without saying that the legalisation of lethal arms exports was very warmly welcomed by Japan’s arms industry, although, according to the business daily Nihon Keizai, Japanese arms manufacturers, long confined to the SDF as their sole customer, will initially struggle to achieve the production scale needed to compete in the global arms market.

Gradually emerging from its rigid pacifism, Japan is now openly developing defence partnerships with NATO and European Union countries, some of these projects dating back to 2022. It thus joins South Korea, Australia and New Zealand as one of NATO’s four privileged partners (IP4) in Asia.

The Japan-NATO partnership is not new, but it has taken on a new dimension under Ms Takaichi, as Tokyo now positions itself as a more assertive partner, freed from the past constraints of its pacifism. In January 2025, Japan upgraded its representation to NATO to embassy status. In June 2026, four officers from the Japanese SDF were seconded to NATO as part of the assistance programme for Ukraine.

With Europe, the UK-Japan-Italy tripartite “GCAP” programme to develop a next-generation fighter aircraft by 2035 is in full swing and could be expanded to include Poland, Sweden and Canada.

With London, Tokyo has a reciprocal troop access agreement, while military exercises have taken place in Japan with French and British forces. In April 2026, 30 ambassadors to NATO were in Tokyo to explore new partnership opportunities, which already include cooperation in the defence industry and the sharing of satellite launch sites.

With France, President Macron’s visit to Japan (and South Korea) last April provided an opportunity to reaffirm bilateral cooperation in the field of defence (joint exercises, coordination, intelligence and co-development). The French President also reiterated his proposal, first made in May 2025, to establish a coalition of independent powers between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. In addition, the French Navy and Foreign Legion conducted exercises with Japanese, US and Australian forces in the East China Sea in May 2021, under Beijing’s nose. France and Japan also participated jointly in the “Balikatan” military exercises in the Philippines last April, alongside US and Australian forces.

Conclusion

Despite the sensation caused by what has been interpreted as a “historic abandonment of pacifism” (The Week), the reopening of Japanese lethal arms exports ultimately represents only another stage in the country’s eight-decade transformation from “absolute pacifism” towards what former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called “proactive pacifism”. This year’s “rearmament” is merely the latest in a series of rearmament measures undertaken since the promulgation of the pacifist Constitution in 1946.

The growing sense of crisis in the face of Chinese and North Korean threats has gradually softened the pacifism and antimilitarism of Japanese public opinion, to the point that it now accepts a limited revision of the fundamental law. Nevertheless, despite this slight shift in public opinion in favour of “updating” the Constitution, the population as a whole remains strongly opposed to any amendment of Article 9 (the permanent renunciation of war, the maintenance of armed forces and the right of belligerency).

This ambivalence in public opinion is leading Ms Takaichi and her LDP to seek a compromise for the constitutional revision currently under consideration. Thus, instead of rewriting Article 9 to create a genuine “national army”, as conservatives would have preferred, the proposal this time is simply to add a clause legalising the status of the SDF.

Internationally, the latest in Japan’s series of rearmament measures has prompted mixed reactions from its neighbours. While China sounds the alarm by condemning a “return of Japanese militarism”, the rest of East and Southeast Asia has responded rather favourably to the strategic awakening of an industrial and democratic giant capable of filling the vacuum left by America in the face of China’s growing influence. According to Asia Times, a “rearmed” Japan is thus demonstrating “vigilance and responsibility”.

Amid current geostrategic volatility, Japan’s emergence as a strategically proactive power promises to facilitate closer East-West ties among middle powers, particularly between the Old Continent, concerned about the Russian threat, and the Indo-Pacific, concerned about China’s growing shadow.

The security partnerships Tokyo is simultaneously developing with Europe and Indo-Pacific countries should make Japan the hub of future cooperation between Europeans and the Indo-Pacific security community, which has long been America’s preserve.

Despite the sensational media coverage of Japan’s transition from absolute pacifism to proactive pacifism, it must be acknowledged that the increasingly belligerent political and military shift to the right (exports of lethal weapons, doubling of the military budget, creation of a powerful intelligence agency, criminalisation of acts of desecration of the national flag, tighter immigration controls, plans for an emergency clause in the Constitution, exclusion of women from the line of succession to the Imperial Throne, etc.), intensified since Takaichi Sanae came to power, is far from being to the liking of the fundamentally pacifist and antimilitarist Japanese population.

As anti-war demonstrations multiply in the streets, the dramatic fall in the nationalist leader’s approval rating (from 70% in November 2025 to 41–61% in July this year) reflects, among other things, a public backlash against what is perceived as the nationalist Prime Minister’s desire to transform pacifist Japan into a “country free to wage war”.

[1] Constitution of Japan, Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, shall never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state shall not be recognised.

[2] To amend the Constitution, approval by two-thirds of each House of the Diet is required, followed by a majority of votes cast in favour in a referendum.

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